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ABSTRACT 
Southeast Asia is experiencing a nuclear energy renaissance.  Why have some 
Southeast Asian countries chosen to pursue nuclear power, while others have not?  
Among those pursuing nuclear energy, why are some moving more quickly than others?  
The hypothesis of this thesis is that countries are more likely pursue nuclear power if its 
benefits outweigh benefits from the same level of effort in other sources of energy.  
Analyses of these countries with respect to nuclear energy using electricity demand, 
alternative energy sources, political will, means of production, technical capacity and 
international support resulted in three categories: countries that abstain from it (Brunei, 
Cambodia, East Timor, Laos and Singapore), countries that may pursue it (Burma, 
Malaysia and the Philippines) and countries that are pursuing it (Indonesia, Thailand and 
Vietnam).  Countries that abstained do so either because greater benefit can be achieved 
with the same level of national effort in other areas or because nuclear energy was 
politically ill suited to their specific needs.  Countries on the fence face political obstacles 
that have yet to be overcome.  Countries pursuing it do so based on a need to expand 
electricity capacity to sustain economic development, with the rate of pursuit dominated 
by their political circumstance. 
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I. NUCLEAR POWER PHENOMENON IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Growing concern about the economic and environmental costs of fossil fuels has 
encouraged countries throughout the world to reconsider nuclear energy. Among them 
are several Southeast Asian countries.  In particular, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam 
plan to begin using nuclear energy to generate electricity by 2020.  However, despite 
similar concerns, other Southeast Asian countries are not considering nuclear energy as 
an alternative to fossil fuels or are on the fence about it. 
This thesis aims to answer two main questions: Why have some Southeast Asian 
countries chosen to pursue nuclear power, while others have not?  And among those that 
have opted for nuclear energy, why are some moving more quickly than others?  In order 
to answer these questions, the underlying factors driving each country’s position on 
nuclear energy must be analyzed.  In the case of countries pursuing nuclear energy, 
analysis must address the same factors to reason out why they are moving at different 
speeds. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The main reasons why nuclear energy development in Southeast Asia are 
significant are its contribution to sustaining economic growth, the safety concerns unique 
to this particular energy source, and the security concerns associated with nuclear 
material.  Wide price fluctuations and the threat of inevitable exhaustion of fossil fuels 
increase the urgency of developing a large scale alternative in order to sustain economic 
growth.  The rapid rate of development in Asia as a whole has produced a drastic rise in 
energy demand, which has also raised world energy costs.  As the cost of conventional 
sources of energy rose over the last 10 years, nuclear energy gradually became a more 
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competitive alternative financially and environmentally.1  In some Southeast Asian cases, 
the pressure to sustain growth and development is tied to regime legitimacy and even 
regime survival.  How a Southeast Asian country deals with energy challenges and where 
nuclear energy fits into the picture can have implications for its future growth and 
development. 
The mere pursuit of nuclear energy has safety and security ramifications for the 
entire region.  The safety requirements associated with nuclear energy are unique because 
it uses fuel and generates waste materials that are extremely toxic with long decay lives.  
These must be handled with great care, especially in Southeast Asia where many adverse 
environmental conditions, such as monsoons, floods, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, 
are common.2  Disastrous events involving any aspect of nuclear power, whether man-
made or natural, recognize no sovereign boundaries and will have negative impacts on 
the region at large for generations.  The potential health and safety impact of such an 
event could be dramatic and widespread.  Three Mile Island and Chernobyl stand as a 
grim reminder of that.  Safety issues have already been vocalized by the Indonesian 
public. 
Nuclear energy development in Southeast Asia poses significant concern in 
regional security.  It is widely acknowledged that Southeast Asia is a transit point for 
transnational terrorists.  The region also has problems with indigenous terrorist activities 
and armed separatist movements.  Although these activities have been rare in Vietnam, 
they have been frequent in the two other countries most inclined to pursue nuclear power 
—Indonesia and Thailand.  Countries developing nuclear energy must take account of 
these security risks which can threaten regional stability.  Thus, security protocols must 
be sufficient to ensure the safety of such facilities against possible attacks.  A second 
security concern is nuclear proliferation.  With the pursuit of nuclear power comes the 
 
1 John Sheffield, “World Population and Energy Demand Growth: The Potential Role of Fusion 
Energy in an Efficient World,” Philosophical Transactions: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering 
Sciences 357, no. 1752, The Approach to Ignited Plasma, (1999): 378–379, http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed 
July 30, 2008). 
2 Andrew Symon, “Southeast Asia's Nuclear Power Thrust: Putting ASEAN's Effectiveness to the 
Test,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 1 (2008): 5, http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed 
July 31 2008). 
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risk of nuclear proliferation due to the possible development of latent nuclear capability 
as an offshoot.3  It is critical to identify the likely developers of nuclear power and fully 
analyze the intent and policies behind their nuclear energy programs. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS. 
The major questions identified in the introduction lead to several important 
problems and issues associated with the development of nuclear energy in Southeast 
Asia.  Only a small number of Southeast Asian countries are pursuing nuclear power 
even though all are facing similar energy pressures.  The main hypothesis of this thesis is 
that countries are more likely to invest in nuclear power when its benefits outweigh those 
attained from the same level of national investment in other sources of energy.  The 
factors in determining this opportunity costs are electricity demand, availability of 
alternatives, political will, means of production, technical capacity and international 
support.  If the combination of these factors within a specific Southeast Asian country 
produces a favorable condition for nuclear energy, then that country pursues it.  If not, 
they abstain from serious effort.  Depending on the outcome of these six factors, some 
countries may also decide to postpone the decision to commit to nuclear energy until a 
later date, keeping the door open by expressing interest in the technology for future 
applications 
A country’s electricity demand is an important variable in accounting for whether 
or not it will pursue nuclear energy.  It is the first aspect in assessing the need for nuclear 
energy.  Future electricity demand in Southeast Asia is expected to be significantly larger 
than present demand.  There are more consumers of energy in Southeast Asia today than 
in the past and there will be significantly more in the near future.  The concentration of 
this increase is not evenly distributed across Southeast Asia.  Individual countries will 
have different present and future electricity demands.  The urgency of finding an 
alternative large scale energy source is tied to the gap between present and future 
electricity demands.  Nuclear energy option becomes more appealing as this gap grows. 
 
3 Dong‐Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of 
Conflict Solution 51 (2007), 169–173, http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/  (accessed November 17, 
2008). 
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The availability of alternatives to nuclear energy for large scale electricity 
production plays a significant role in determining whether or not a country will pursue 
nuclear energy.  It is the second half of assessing a need for nuclear energy.  Some 
Southeast Asian countries may have a relatively abundant amount of fossil fuel resources, 
making the need to pursue nuclear energy less urgent.  Some countries may have other 
resources, such as hydro- or geothermal-power that can be used to produce large scale 
electricity.  Each country’s energy portfolio will require an independent look and analysis 
in order to deduce how it affects the decision to pursue nuclear energy.  The fewer 
alternatives a country has, the more likely it will commit to nuclear energy. 
The endeavor to develop nuclear energy requires the support of the state.  The 
level of political will for developing nuclear energy varies from country to country in 
Southeast Asia.  Political will is a function of electricity demand, available alternatives 
and other domestic variables specific to that country in states where governments are 
more sensitive to the needs of its people.  In Southeast Asian states where this is much 
less the case, the factors of electricity demand and available alternatives have a lesser 
effect.  Political turmoil, lack of government effectiveness and transparency, a proclivity 
towards corruption and other inefficiencies are common problems in the governments of 
Southeast Asia.  This issue greatly reduces a country’s possibility to pursue nuclear 
energy by bringing into question its ability to maintain safety and security of such a 
program.  For some Southeast Asian countries, mustering the political will to pursue 
nuclear energy is unachievable at present.  Another part of the answer may also lie in 
analyzing the different political institutions in each country.  An authoritarian political 
institution may have an easier time making the national decision to pursue nuclear energy 
and directing its national effort toward developing nuclear power.  A more open or liberal 
state may spend a significant amount of time and effort debating the issue because of 
safety and security implications.  The political nature and domestic drivers specific to 
each Southeast Asian country interested in nuclear energy will be a big factor in 
determining whether it will pursue nuclear energy and how committed it is to that pursuit.  
Capital and labor can present an obstacle to nuclear energy development in certain 
Southeast Asian countries.  Some Southeast Asian countries may not have the ability to 
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amass sufficient technical labor and capital to pursue nuclear energy.  The issue of 
adequate factors of production to develop nuclear energy is also an application of 
opportunity cost analysis to indigenous factors of production. The more economic 
strength a country has, the better the chance that it can meet the heavy initial financial 
burden of a nuclear program.  Likewise, the more skilled labor a country has in its 
workforce, the more likely it can build and maintain a nuclear power facility.  The nature 
of a country’s ruling regime may also impact the two subsets of this factor.  An 
authoritarian regime may have less capital, but it may be more willing to spend a larger 
fraction of its GDP on a nuclear program.  Skilled labor distribution in the same regime 
can likewise be directed more heavily towards a nuclear power plant if the regime desires 
it. 
Another obstacle to developing nuclear power in Southeast Asia is acquiring the 
human capital and talent necessary to supervise the construction of a nuclear facility and 
to maintain and operate this program safely and effectively.  The technical capacity 
aspect of nuclear power deals with the knowledge, proficiency and training of the 
operators and administrators.  Acquiring and maintaining these skill sets in Southeast 
Asia requires significant investment on the part of the state and its public.  Legions of 
scientists, engineers and administrative bureaucrats must be trained and a collective sense 
of integrity and commitment must be fostered, a feat that takes years, if not decades.  
Quality control, an issue in which Southeast Asian industries are notoriously weak, must 
be elevated to the high standards demanded by this field to withstand the torturous 
operating conditions of nuclear processes and the potentially inhospitable environment 
present in Southeast Asia.  A country is more likely to pursue nuclear energy when it has 
higher levels of technical capacity. 
Nuclear energy requires significant amounts of technical knowledge and 
resources.  All Southeast Asian countries have accepted this reality and seek assistance 
from the international community.  The support provided by the international community 
is the fundamental ingredient necessary to develop a nuclear energy program and 
includes technology, materials and political legitimacy (consent).  Without these three 
elements, a Southeast Asian country’s goal of nuclear power cannot come to fruition.  
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Sources of international support include the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and other nuclear technology holders such as the United States, China, Japan, 
Korea, France and Russia.  The determinant of whether international support is provided 
hinges on national interest of the technology holder, including concerns of nuclear 
weapon proliferation and the impact on regional stability.  As mentioned previously, 
nuclear energy development has regional implications for safety and security that 
recognize no borders.  Any event involving nuclear material within the region can 
severely impact stability, a concern for many in the international community, especially 
for those that hold nuclear technology.  Without some form of international support, 
nuclear energy will not succeed in any country in Southeast Asia. 
Analyses of the eleven Southeast Asian countries for these six factors results in 
three categories.  The first category is countries that are most likely to abstain from 
pursuing nuclear energy in the foreseeable future.  These countries are Brunei, Cambodia, 
Timor-Leste, Laos and Singapore.  The reasons for each countries decision are varied, but 
all are based on the specific realities each faces with respect to the six factors above.  
Brunei and Singapore are of special note because they are the only two in this category 
who have the national capability to pursue nuclear energy but choose to abstain.  The 
second category is countries that may potentially pursue nuclear energy in the near future.  
These countries are Burma, Malaysia and the Philippines.  Again, the reasons behind the 
decision of each country vary, with one or two factors playing a dominant role in each 
decision to abstain from pursuing nuclear energy for now.  But what makes these 
countries special is that they each have internal drivers that may shift the balance of this 
decision away from abstinence and towards pursuing nuclear energy.  The final category 
is countries that have elected to pursue nuclear energy.  These countries are Indonesia, 
Thailand and Vietnam.  Each pursues nuclear energy at different rates, with Vietnam 
being the most aggressive and Thailand being the least aggressive.  On the surface this 
trend may seem contrary to their current electricity demand profile, but the other five 
factors weigh in to justify this trend. 
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D. WHAT THE NUCLEAR ENERGY COMMUNITY IS AND IS NOT 
DISCUSSING 
The current trend in analyzing the development of nuclear energy in Southeast 
Asia is focused on its implications for weapons proliferation and safety.  What is absent 
from recent studies is analysis of why each country in Southeast Asia has decided to 
pursue or not pursue nuclear energy.  Also absent is an analysis of the reasons why the 
countries that have chosen to pursue nuclear energy are doing so at different speeds.  This 
literature review is organized along the theme of what has been emphasized and what has 
been ignored in the literature on nuclear energy in Southeast Asia.  It starts with some 
background information of where nuclear energy stands in Southeast Asia today and 
proceeds to assess how current issues on safety and nuclear proliferation are viewed 
within the region.  It also addresses the absence of analysis on why each Southeast Asian 
country is or is not pursuing nuclear energy.  Of significance in determining the “why 
nuclear power for some and not others in Southeast Asia” question is Peter Gourevitch’s 
hypothesis that different countries respond differently when facing the same economic 
crisis because of internal and external factors specific to these countries.  Could the same 
be true about the decision to pursue or not pursue nuclear energy?  This is the origin of 
this thesis.  Internal and external variables represented by the six factors contribute to the 
decision on nuclear energy for each Southeast Asian country. 
1. Current Situation 
Currently Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam are the countries in Southeast Asia 
serious about nuclear energy.  All three have set goals of a functioning nuclear energy 
program by 2020.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) deems Vietnam and 
Indonesia as very advanced in their development of institutional capabilities necessary 
for a viable nuclear energy program.4  Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines and Singapore 
have expressed some level of interest in nuclear power.  Malaysia lacks the level of 
urgency of the previous three.  Burma is taking steps to get in the nuclear technology 
 
4 Andrew Symon, Nuclear Power in Southeast Asia: Implications for Australia and Non-Proliferation 
(Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008), 11. 
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game with Russian assistance, but it is unclear whether this effort will eventually bear 
fruit in energy generation as planned.5  The Philippines is haunted by a previous bad 
experience with nuclear energy.6  Singapore lacks the necessary space for required safety 
stand-off range of nuclear site from urban areas (30 km).7  Cambodia also jumped on the 
nuclear energy bandwagon when it recently expressed goals to develop an operational 
nuclear energy program by 2020-2025.8  Even the oil-rich country of Brunei is keeping 
the nuclear-energy-door open by holding talks with nuclear energy experts from South 
Korea in early November 2008 on the applicability of nuclear energy for the oil-rich 
Sultanate.9 
2. What the Literature Discusses 
A critical concern among those discussing the renaissance of nuclear energy is 
nuclear proliferation.  Both Iran and North Korea are in pursuit of nuclear technology.  
Each country initially claimed that its pursuit was for providing energy to its general 
population and was in keeping with the norms of peaceful utilization of nuclear 
technology.  North Korea has since tested a nuclear device.  Iran continues to alarm the 
international community with its less than transparent practices and defiance in 
 
 
5 Bertil Lintner, “Burma’s Nuclear Temptation,” Yale Center for the Study of Globalization (2008), 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=11673 (accessed March 13, 2009);  Geoffrey Gunn, “Southeast 
Asia’s Looming Nuclear Power Industry,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (2008), 
http://www.japanfocus.org/_Geoffrey_ Gunn-Southeast_Asia_s_Looming_Nuclear_Power_Industry/ 
(accessed January 15, 2009). 
6 Adrian Addison, “Philippines revisits nuclear energy option at 'white elephant' plant,” Agence 
Frence-Presse, January 8, 2009, http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/reframing/aust-ind-
nuclear/ind-np/asean-nuclear-power/philippines (accessed January 16, 2009); Raymund Jose Quilop, 
“Using Nuclear Energy: A Philippine Experience,” Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP), Nuclear Transparency in the Asia Pacific, http://www.cscap.nuctrans.org/Nuc_Trans/links/ 
frames/top-participants.htm (accessed January 16, 2009). 
7 Lee Kwan Yew, Transcript of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s Dialoge with Singapore Energy 
Conference, November 4, 2008, Raffles City Convention Centre, http://www.news.gov.sg/ (accessed 
November 19, 2008). 
8 Ker Munthit, “Cambodia Eyes Nuclear Plant for Electricity,” Associated Press, September 26, 2008, 
http://www.ap.org (accessed October 20, 2008); Kay Kimsong, “Cambodia Sets Sights on Nuclear Power,” 
The Phnom Penh Post, Cambodia, September 29, 2008, http://www.phnompenhpost.com (accessed 
October 20, 2008). 
9 Nurkhayrul Salam, “BEna to Host Forum on Nuclear Energy,” The Burnei Times, Brunei, September 
11, 2008, http://www.bt.com.bn (accessed October 20, 2008). 
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continuing a domestic uranium enrichment program.  As a general trend, Iran has become 
even more secretive about its nuclear program.  Much of the international community is 
very concerned with both countries. 
Contrary to this trend, the international community is less concerned about 
nuclear weapons proliferation in Southeast Asian countries.  The detailed study 
conducted by Michael Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-White suggests that only under 
significant threat of a neighboring country developing nuclear weapons will Indonesia or 
Vietnam weaponize.  Since these two countries are the vanguard of nuclear development 
within the region and neither has yet moved to weaponization, it is unlikely that either 
one will because of the responsive nature of its views on weaponizing.10  In the case of 
Vietnam, further evidence of its non-proliferation intent was demonstrated when it 
recently returned weapons-grade uranium from the Da Lat research reactor to Russia for 
processing.  This transfer was negotiated by the U.S. Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative.11  As it stands, all ASEAN countries are parties to the Southeast Asian 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ or Treaty of Bangkok, in effect since 
1997).12  No ASEAN country has demonstrated a trend deviating from this treaty.  The 
threat of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia is small unless something significantly 
changes in the political and/or security environment in Southeast Asia.13 
With the ghosts of Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl still haunting nuclear 
energy, people in Southeast Asia are genuinely concerned about whether or not their 
government can ensure the safe operation of nuclear plants.  As demonstrated by these 
two disasters, a nuclear incident has dire, wide-reaching and long term effects.  The 
safety culture developed by the nuclear power industry in Western countries has passed 
its heyday and is trying to redeem itself from TMI and Chernobyl.  Constance Perin 
 
10 Michael S. Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-White, “The Development of Latent Nuclear Capabilities in 
Southeast Asia: is the Outcome ‘All Too Predictable’?” The Nonproliferation Review 16, no. 3 (March 
2009), 27–28, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/161toc.htm (accessed March 15, 2009). 
11 Ralph Vartabedian, “A Race with the Terrorist,” Los Angeles Times, Edition A-1, September 27, 
2007, via Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed August 2, 2008). 
12 Symon, Nuclear Power in Southeast Asia: Implications for Australia and Non-Proliferation, 13–14. 
13 Malley and Ogilvie-White, 27–29. 
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nevertheless raises concern in an overview of how nuclear power safety culture grew and 
excelled during the formative years of nuclear energy, then declined.  The safety culture 
became victim to complacency and neglect in the industry until disastrous events jerked it 
back into the limelight, if only for a little while.14   
This simple human behavior pattern is not lost on the public in Southeast Asia.  
Couple this with a poor track record of public safety prevalent throughout the region and 
you have an environment where the public is greatly concerned about nuclear technical 
know-how and operational competence.  This situation is especially true in the case of 
Indonesia.15  Already prone to numerous natural disasters by virtue of being part of “the 
Ring of Fire” along the Pacific Rim, the Indonesian government has compounded its 
precarious situation by deciding to locate its first nuclear power plant on a site near Mt. 
Muria (a dormant volcano).  The threat of earthquakes presents an engineering safety 
issue in the construction of a nuclear plant.  Add to that the possibility of a volcanic 
eruption and one can see why the Indonesian public (specifically environmentalists and 
local villagers) would express concern for safety.16 
Other safety issues concern the acquisition of the technical know-how and 
operational competency.  This investment in human capital is not out of reach for any 
serious nuclear energy developer.  The IAEA and numerous other nuclear technology 
holders (including the United States, France, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea) are 
willing to provide training and assistance for the right price.17  This price may be in the 
form of non-tangibles like stability, influence, cooperation or policy support.  In this 
sense, it pays to be the one guiding these fledgling nuclear energy developers to maturity. 
Safety as the by-product of security is also a concern.  Indonesia and Thailand are 
known transit points for transnational terrorists.  Nuclear facilities in these countries 
 
14 Constance Perin, Shouldering Risks: The Culture of Control in the Nuclear Power Industry 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005). 
15 Malley and Ogilvie-White, 16. 
16 Malley and Ogilvie-White, 8–9; Symon, “Nuclear Power in Southeast Asia,” 5. 
17 Symon, “Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Power Thrust: Putting ASEAN’s Effectiveness to the Test?” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30, no. 1 (2008), 126-130, Project Muse via Dudley Knox Library 
http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy. nps.edu (accessed July 20, 2008); Symon, “Nuclear Power in Southeast 
Asia,” 5–7. 
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could serve as potential targets for these terrorists, whether for exploitation or direct 
action.  Contemporary assessments are that Southeast Asian countries lack the security 
infrastructure and capability, at present, to prevent determined action against such 
facilities.18 
With all this discussion and debate, a fundamental element is still missing from 
the analysis of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia.  That is, if nuclear energy is becoming 
economically competitive and if there is no significant threat of weaponization in 
Southeast Asia, why are not all Southeast Asian countries pursuing nuclear energy as the 
alternative to fossil fuels? 
3. What the Literature Neglects 
Current discussions on nuclear power attribute its return as an alternative to fossil 
fuels for large scale energy production to its increasing economic and environmental 
competitiveness.  Of all eleven countries in Southeast Asia facing fossil fuel pressures, 
only three are seriously pursuing nuclear energy and only a handful more are making 
statements or gestures of interest in nuclear energy.  If nuclear power is such a good 
solution for this issue, why isn’t there more interest?  Why aren’t all Southeast Asian 
countries trying to pursue it, at least to a degree commensurate with their developmental 
situation?  Maybe nuclear energy is not the best solution or, more specifically, maybe 
nuclear energy is not the best solution for every Southeast Asian country.  Some insight 
into answering these questions may be found in Peter Gourevitch’s study on policy 
choices of different countries responding to the same external pressure. 
In Politics in Hard Times, Gourevitch studied five Western nations responding to 
three separate periods of economic crisis in the 19th and 20th centuries.  The purpose of 
Gourevitch’s study was to understand the politics of policy choices of the countries in the 
case study.19  Gourevitch hypothesized that different factors both internal and external 
 
18 Malley and Ogilvie-White, 16; Symon, “Southeast Asia's Nuclear Power Thrust,” 130, 134 – 135; 
Symon, “Nuclear Power in Southeast Asia,” 3, 11; Vartabedian, “A Race with the Terrorist.” 
19 Rand W. Smith, “International Economy and State Strategies: Recent Work in Comparative 
Political Economy,” Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (April 1993), 356–358. 
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can cause countries in similar situations to respond differently.20  This principle of policy 
choices during economic crises can be translated to that of an energy crisis with little 
loss.  After all, energy can be treated just like any other commodity that is traded 
internationally.  An international economic crisis usually involves a significant change in 
the status of one or several factors in world trade, like a commodity.  Energy pressures 
can worsen into crisis for Southeast Asian countries.  To wait for such a crisis to emerge 
before trying to alleviate this pressure would be a poor energy policy.  Each country will 
come up with its own specific response tailored to its specific conditions.  
4. Literature Review Conclusion 
The contemporary discussion on nuclear energy development in Southeast Asia is 
focused mainly on its security implications with little to no analysis on why each country 
has selected the policy choice to pursue or not pursue.  Filling this gap will provide a 
better understanding of each Southeast Asian country’s course of action.  This can have 
policy implications in helping to anticipate the focal concerns of each emerging Southeast 
Asian nuclear energy program.  An anticipatory foreign policy strategy has greater 
benefit than a reactive one.  To develop an anticipatory calculus means identifying and 
concentrating on the same focal issues as the country of interest.  In this case, the 
countries of interest are those that are pursuing nuclear energy.  Currently, this list 
includes Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, but Brunei, Burma, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Singapore cannot be entirely ruled out with a cursory glance.  As outlined in Section 
C of this chapter, an alternative category of countries exists beyond those pursuing and 
those abstaining from nuclear energy.  This third category of countries may decide to 
pursue nuclear energy in the near future when domestic and international conditions suit 
it.  By understanding the factors behind the policy choices of these countries, it will be 




20 Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic 
Crisis (New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), 19. 
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Southeast Asian countries follow suit if any of the three pursuers are successful?  Only 
time will tell, but this thesis may give a shadow of what is to come by understanding the 
reasons behind current policies and positions. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES FOR THIS THESIS 
This thesis conducts a comparative study among the Southeast Asian countries to 
ascertain why each country pursues or does not pursue nuclear energy using the six 
factors outlined in Section C.  Pertaining to Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, further 
analysis is conducted to explain the different speed of pursuit. 
Gourevitch’s process would only cover a portion of opportunity cost analysis 
required in this issue.  It touches on adequate production factors, political will and 
international support, but it leaves the material and resource aspects untouched.  By 
including each country’s energy demand, availability of alternatives, and technical 
capacity, this thesis tailors the analysis towards this more technical issue.  In analyzing 
the combination of the six factors, this thesis addresses the problems and issues dealing 
with each state’s ability and desire to develop nuclear power by fully assessing the 
opportunity costs of pursuing nuclear energy in Southeast Asia.  The main sources for 
this analysis are energy, political and economic journal articles specializing in Asia and 
news sources. 
F. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
The analysis for this thesis covers three categories of Southeast Asian countries, 
each characterized by its members’ attitude towards nuclear energy.  This introduction 
chapter delineated the research question and its significance and established the initial 
hypothesis to be supported by subsequent chapters.  Chapter II covers the analysis of 
Southeast Asian countries that have decided to abstain from pursuing nuclear energy in 
the foreseeable future.  Each country’s six opportunity cost factors will be examined and 
used to explain why nuclear power is not the right answer for solving its energy demand 
issues.  Chapter III offers an analysis of Southeast Asian countries that may potentially 
pursue nuclear energy in the near future but have not taken a serious interest in it at 
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present.  The six factors are used to assess why these countries have abstained from 
nuclear energy thus far and why they move to pursue nuclear energy in the near future.  
Chapter IV provides a detailed comparison among the countries that have decided to 
pursue nuclear energy according to the six factors and asks what accounts for the 
variations in each country’s speed of nuclear energy development.  Safety and security 
issues are also be analyzed in order to assess their impact in national decision making 
concerning the development of a nuclear energy program.  Chapter V is a policy 
recommendation for how the United States should approach the expansion of nuclear 
energy in Southeast Asia. 
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II. COUNTRIES ABSTAINING FROM NUCLEAR ENERGY 
A. THE FACTORS IN THEIR DECISION TO ABSTAIN 
It is unlikely that Brunei, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Laos and Singapore will 
pursue nuclear energy in the foreseeable future—ceteris paribus.  The goal of this chapter 
is to determine how the six factors contributing to a country’s decision on nuclear energy 
combine to affect their decision in light of the energy pressures they face.  To recap, these 
six factors are electricity demand, availability of alternatives, political will, means of 
production, technical capacity, and international support.  Some factors will have a more 
dominant effect on a particular country’s decision making, depending on the specific 
circumstances of to that country.  This chapter will define each factor and examine the 
effects it has on these five Southeast Asian countries, including comparisons and parallels 
between countries with stark differences or similarities.  The chapter will conclude with 
an overarching assessment, drawing out the dominate factors for why each of these 
countries are not pursuing nuclear energy. 
B. ELECTRICITY DEMAND 
Electricity demand in Southeast Asia is driven by economic growth and 
development within the region.  The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Energy 
Demand and Supply Outlook 2006 breaks down energy demand drivers in Southeast Asia 
as industry, transportation, residential and commercial.  At present, industry and 
transportation are heavily dependent on oil in a manner that cannot be substituted by 
nuclear energy.  Examples of these uses of oil are the petro-chemical industry and fueling 
commercial transportation such as trains, planes, automobiles and shipping.  Regional 
industries do consume electricity but at a significantly lower rate than oil and other fossil 
fuels at present.  As a country’s industrial makeup increases in value-added industries, its 
dependency on electricity goes up, because value-added industries are generally more 
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depend on electricity.  By 2030, it is expected that the largest share of industrial energy 
demand in Asia will be electricity based on the trend of industrial grow in Asia.21   
The electricity demands analyzed by this thesis will focus on Southeast Asian 
industrial, residential and commercial sectors, which rely primarily on coal, oil, natural 
gas or hydropower.  It can also be assumed that an urban populace consumes more 
electricity per capita then a rural populace, so an increase in urbanization will equate to a 
subsequent increase in energy consumption, mainly in electricity for residents and 
workplaces, natural gas for cooking and oil for transportation.22  Nuclear energy can 
contribute to the shares of electricity demand.  Therefore if a country’s demand for 
electricity is high, it is more likely that the country will seek nuclear energy to provide 
relief from fossil fuel dependency.  Factors that will lead to high electricity demand are 
expansion of value-added industries and commercial sectors, and increased urbanization. 
1. Brunei 
Brunei is a small country whose electricity production capacity currently exceeds 
its consumption by a small margin.23  Brunei’s primary energy demand is anticipated to 
increase from 2.7 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 2002 to 3.3 Mtoe in 2030.  This 
increase in energy demand is driven by the growth in the electricity and transportation 
sectors.  Brunei is a country rich in oil and natural gas, and its economy relies heavily on 
the export revenues from both.  Facing the vulnerability of oil price volatility, Brunei is 
looking to break away from the resource curse by diversifying its sources of revenue.  It 
is planning to expand and strengthen the hydrocarbon (petro-chemical) and non-oil 




21 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: 
Executive Summary, Asia Pacific Energy Research Center (Tokyo, 2006), 2, http://www.ieej.or.jp/aperc/ 
outlook2006.html (accessed December 23, 2008).  
22 Ibid, 5. 
23 Central Intelligence Agency, “Geography, People, Government and Economy Information,” The 
World Factbook: Brunei, (2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed 
January 26, 2009). 
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these sectors.  Expansions of its industries in this direction will increase its electricity 
demand overall.  To account for this, Brunei is also planning to extend its electricity grid 
and increase its electricity generation capability.24 
A high urbanization rate is a consequence of Brunei’s continuing development 
and fossil fuel riches.  The Brunei Darussalam provides for numerous public goods to 
include state funded education and healthcare, and subsidies for rice and housing.25  The 
combination of these social services and the growing urban job demand driven by 
economic expansion makes for a good incentive for people to flock to cities and urban 
centers.  In 2002, Brunei was 75% urbanized.  This number is expected to reach 85% by 
2030.26  Brunei is experiencing growth in value-added industries and urbanization.  Both 
are drivers for increased electricity consumption and favor the development of a large 
scale energy system like nuclear energy when electricity demand is exclusively 
examined.  However, Brunei’s plan for expanding its electricity production capacity is all 
natural gas based and not nuclear. 
2. Cambodia 
Cambodia’s electricity infrastructure was heavily damaged by war and is 
currently in a recovering state.  The source of electricity for the majority of the country is 
diesel generators connected to ad-hoc electrical grids.  Cambodia’s capital Phnom Penh 
accounts for about 70% of the country’s electricity consumption.  This primary urban 
center is home to the majority of Cambodia’s industry made up mostly of textile, garment 
and shoe manufacturing.  This accounts for a large its share of electricity consumption.  
Cambodia’s primary obstacle to meeting its electricity demand problem is its lack of 
infrastructure; generation capacity is a close second.  Ironically, poor infrastructure gives 
 
24 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: 
Brunei Darussalam, Asia Pacific Energy Research Center (Tokyo, 2006), 7-10, http://www.ieej.or.jp/aperc/ 
outlook2006.html (accessed December 23, 2008); Department of Energy (DOE), “Country Analysis Brief: 
Brunei,” Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the United States Government, November 20, 2000, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/brunei.html (accessed December 22, 2008). 
25 CIA, The World Factbook: Brunei. 
26 APEC, APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: Brunei Darussalam, 7-10; DOE, 
“Country Analysis Brief: Brunei.” 
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this sparsely electrified country one of the highest electricity prices within the 
region.27The Cambodian government is looking to expand electrification within the 
country in order to improve the standard of living of the populace and ensure 
sustainability for future growth.  For on-grid sectors, Cambodia is looking to improve 
basic infrastructure in order to improve efficiency and minimize electrical losses.  For 
off-grid sectors, Cambodia is looking to renewable energy sources such as solar and wind 
energy on a communal scale to take advantage of their potential long term benefits.28  
Future electricity demands in Cambodia were expected to greatly increase based on the 
rate of development prior to the 2008 global recession.  With current economic 
uncertainties, that rate of development will be negatively impacted. 
Provincial towns are expected to consume a peak of up to 173 MW by 2010.  
Approximately 85% of the population is rural.  Cambodia’s population is mostly rural 
and widely dispersed, making it less conducive to a centralized large scale power output 
system like nuclear plants.  Based on its relatively small electricity demand and lack of 
infrastructure, it would make more sense to invest in essential infrastructure repairs and 
development rather than nuclear energy to meet Cambodia’s present and future electricity 
demands. 
3. Timor-Leste 
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is still recovering from its chaotic 
emergence into the international community as an independent nation.  The recent crisis 
has left Timor-Leste’s energy infrastructure devastated.  The World Bank’s International 
development Association is working with Timor-Leste to restore the Comoro Power 
station and the electrical power distribution to Dili.  This assistance will extend to 
rehabilitating Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Natural Resources, Minerals and Energy Policy 
 
27 United Nations, “Draft: Cambodia Energy Sector Strategy,” United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development, 5-14, http://www.un.org/esa/ 
agenda21/natlinfo/countr/cambodia/energy.pdf (accessed December 23, 2008). 
28 Ibid, 6 -7; Chandara Lim and Suon Ponnarith, “Energy Resources in Cambodia,” General 
Directorate of Energy Hydro Electricity Department, Hangzhou Regional Center (Asai-Pacific) for Small 
Hydro Power (SHP), http://www.hrcshp.org/en/world/ db/Energy_Resources_in_Cambodia.pdf (accessed 
December 23, 2008). 
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(MNRMEP) and the U.N. established national utility company, Electricidade de Timor-
Leste (EdTL), to become self-sufficient and effective in the long term.29 
The power system left by Indonesia’s National Power Corporation (NPC) in 1999 
was severely damaged during the violence and destruction of that year.  EdTL is 
currently operating this power system and providing electricity to about 43,500 
households or 22% of the country.  Approximately half of these households are in Dili 
and its surrounding areas.  This urban area is about 85% electrified comparing to the 5% 
in the rural areas.  In June 2007, residential consumption of energy (both urban and rural) 
accounted for 55% of Timor-Leste’s electricity demand.  Industrial and commercial 
consumption of electricity accounted for only 26% of the country’s overall demand, and 
government use for the remaining 19%.  The country’s electricity demand is being met 
entirely by imported diesel making the price of electricity one of the most expensive 
within the region (like Cambodia).30  At present, Timor-Leste’s electricity demand issues 
surround the re-establishment of necessary infrastructure to free itself from the heavy 
dependency on external support for electrical power.  Nuclear energy is more than a 
distant aspiration for this troubled nation. 
4. Laos 
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) currently has a small 
electricity demand that is expected to moderately grow in the next decade.  Its population 
is 80%31 rural and agriculture (mostly rice farming) still accounts for the largest share of 
its GDP (~40%).  The urbanization rate is low since Laos had no railways and only a 
rudimentary road system, and so much of its GDP is still dependent on agriculture.  Lao 
 
29 The World Bank, Project Paper on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 1.64 Million (US $2.5 
Million Equivalent) to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste for Energy Services Delivery Project, The 
World Bank International Development Association Report No: 39717-TP, June 7, 2007, 1, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&men
uPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000020439_20070614093828 
(accessed December 23, 2008). 
30 Ibid, 2. 
31 Sommano Pholsena and Daovong Phonekeo.  Loa hydropower potential and policy in the GMS 
context.  United Nations Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Development Beijing, China, 
October 27, 2004, 2. 
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industry is based on resource extraction with the largest sectors being mining and hydro-
electric power export (30% of GDP revenue).  Its main client for hydropower export is its 
electricity-hungry neighbor Thailand, with plans to start selling electricity to Vietnam in 
2010.32 
At present, Lao’s electricity generation capability is about 685 MW with the 
majority coming from hydropower (~98% or 671 MW) and the small remainder coming 
from diesel.33  In 2007, only 59.3% of the electricity produced by the Lao PDR was 
consumed domestically.34  Even with no additional generation capacity brought online, 
the domestic peak electricity demand would not grow to match current production 
capacity until 2020.35  Lao’s relatively small electricity demand compared to present 
generation capacity negates the need to look at nuclear energy as an alternative source of 
electricity. 
5. Singapore 
Singapore is a small city-state nation with a high per capita electricity demand.  
As a city-state, the majority of Singapore’s populace is urban.  Singapore fits the energy 
profile of a country that would be interested in nuclear energy when looking only at 
electricity demand.  Singapore’s electricity is supplied mostly by natural gas with a small 
fraction being generated by oil fire power plants.  Electricity demand in Singapore is 
projected to increase significantly over the next 20 years (3.7% annually) and is expected 
to reach 18 GW by 2030. 
 
32 Pholsena and Phonekeo, 5; Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Laos, “Geography, 
People, Government and Economy Information,” (2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/ (accessed February 5, 2009). 
33 Pholsena and Phonekeo, 3. 
34 Sanhya Somvichith, Hydropower in Lao PDR and Power Development Plan, powerpoint 
presentation at Executive Summary on Electricite Du Laos (EDL) and Laos Hydropower Development, 
November 21, 2008, Department of Electricity, Ministry of Mines, http://www.edl-laos.com/ (accessed 
December 30, 2008). 
35 Sithanh Vongsiry and Khamphanh Vanlasy, 2002 International Training Course on Chinese SHP, 
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic Ministry of Industry and Handicraft Electricite Du Laos Country Paper 
(Vientiane 2002), Hangzhou Regional Center (Asai-Pacific) for Small Hydro Power (SHP) 
http://www.hrcshp.org/en/world/db/Laos.pdf (accessed December 23, 2008). 
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The main drivers of this growth are the residential and commercial sectors of 
Singapore.  Residential electricity consumption is growing because of the large urban 
populace and high standard of living.  Space cooling is the primary consumer of 
electricity in Singapore’s residential sector, but increased appliance and electronics use 
also contribute.  Commercial electricity use is high because Singapore is Southeast Asia’s 
financial and high-tech hub.  Commercial electricity use is expected to grow at 4.4% 
annually.  Electricity is the only energy source utilized in Singapore’s commercial 
sector.36  From an electricity demand perspective, nuclear power may seem to be an ideal 
means of electricity generation.  Singapore has a high electricity demand localized in a 
very small geographic area with a well established electrical grid but other factors will 
drive Singapore’s calculus away from nuclear energy. 
C. AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SUPPLIES 
The availability of alternatives to nuclear energy for electricity production also 
plays a significant role in determining whether or not a country will pursue nuclear 
energy.  Some Southeast Asian countries are rich in fossil fuel resources, making the 
need to pursue an alternative energy source like nuclear power less urgent or unnecessary 
for the foreseeable future.  It is essential to examine a country’s alternative energy 
sources and compare those to its electricity demand.  These two factors are closely 
related and have a profound impact on each other.  The fewer available alternatives to 
nuclear energy a country has, the more likely that country will commit to nuclear energy.  
This thesis does not consider energy resources such as biomass, palm oil, solar and wind 
energy to be viable large scale alternatives to nuclear energy because of their present 
limitations for use as a large scale energy sources.  Typical candidates for consideration 
as available alternatives are oil, natural gas, coal, hydropower and geothermal energy in 
some cases. 
 
36 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: 
Singapore, Asia Pacific Energy Research Center (Tokyo, 2006), 85 – 89, http://www.ieej.or.jp/aperc/ 
outlook2006.html (accessed December 23, 2008). 
 22
                                                
1. Brunei 
As mentioned in the electricity demand section, Brunei has extensive oil and 
natural gas reserves.  The export of both forms of energy resources account for over 50% 
of Brunei’s GDP and over 90% of its total exports.  Furthermore, Brunei has made a 99% 
shift to natural gas for electricity generation.  Its large natural gas reserves have prompted 
the government to maintain this electricity generation policy out to at least 2030.  The 
electricity generation capacity of Brunei will increase from 2,700 GWh in 2002 to 3,100 
GWh by 2030, all powered by natural gas.  These reserves are large enough to meet the 
projected growth in electricity consumption resulting from industrial expansion and 
urbanization discussed in the electricity demand section and negates the need for 
developing nuclear energy for Brunei’s foreseeable future.37 
2. Cambodia 
Cambodia’s underdeveloped conditions result in a lot of speculations about its 
energy resources.  Recently oil and natural gas reserves were discovered beneath 
Cambodian territorial waters.38  Taking into account Cambodia’s relatively low 
electricity demand, high need for revenue and lack of refining capability, these newly 
discovered resources will more than likely be extracted for export.  Chinese mineral 
surveys from the late 1950s indicated coal deposits in several provinces.  More detailed 
coal surveys are needed to fully assess Cambodia’s coal reserves.  One particular deposit 
in Stung Treng Provence is estimated at 7 million tons of coal.  This can aid in alleviating 
Cambodia’s energy needs if it can be successfully exploited.  Feasibility studies on this 
issue are still needed.39 
Another, more promising, alternative resource for energy available to Cambodia 
is hydropower.  Based on estimates made by the UN in 1995, Cambodia has a potential 
 
37 CIA, The World Factbook: Brunei; APEC, APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: 
Brunei Darussalam, 7-10. 
38 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Cambodia, “Geography, People, Government 
and Economy Information,” (2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
(accessed February 9, 2009). 
39 United Nations, “Draft: Cambodia Energy Sector Strategy,” 8. 
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hydropower capacity of 10,000 MW.  Current hydropower developments are nowhere 
near this level.  The most significant hydropower plant in Cambodia is a Chinese run 
plant with the capacity of 12 MW.  The remainders of Cambodia’s installed hydropower 
plants are small scale mini-hydro plants with generation capabilities only in the kilowatt 
range.  If effectively developed, Cambodia can meet all its electricity demands for several 
decades through hydropower.  Energy shortages will become an issue for sustaining 
development if it is not addressed.  With such potential, Cambodia has focused its future 
energy generation efforts in hydropower instead of nuclear energy with a planned 
increase in generation capacity of about 1190 MW by the timeframe 2020.  This is only 
12% of the total estimated hydropower potential in Cambodia.40 
3. Timor-Leste 
Timor-Leste may have had a small change in fortune with the discovery of off-
shore oil and natural gas reserves.  Like many of its neighbors, Timor-Leste does not 
have refining capability.  It is exporting these resources to its neighbors for revenue and 
not using them directly for electricity production.  In 2005 it established a petroleum fund 
as the repository for its newfound source of income in order to preserve this wealth for 
the future.41   
Although revenue is not an alternative energy resource, it can indirectly contribute 
to providing energy for the populace as payment for fuel and infrastructure repairs.  The 
World Bank recognizes the need to inject much needed aid and assistance into Timor-
Leste’s energy services and is working on a grant for that purpose.  Timor-Leste is 
completely dependent on imported diesel for electricity and will remain so for some time 
into the future because of the lack of infrastructure.  Earned revenue and grants can go 
towards buying energy for now and rebuilding the necessary infrastructure to deliver 
energy to the people.42  Timor-Leste does have available alternatives to nuclear energy in 
its newly-found natural gas and oil reserves off its coast.  However, it still lacks the 
 
40 United Nations, “Draft: Cambodia Energy Sector Strategy,” 6; Lim and Ponnarith. 
41 CIA, The World Factbook: Brunei. 
42 The World Bank, Project Paper on a Proposed Grant in the Amount, 1-6. 
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infrastructure and generation facilities to utilize these fuels.  It will be some time before 
these resources can be used to directly supply electricity to Timor-Leste, but it will take 
less time than pursuing a nuclear energy program for electricity.   
4. Laos 
This underdeveloped country is very rich in hydropower potential, even more so 
than its neighbor, Cambodia, because of its mountainous geography.43  The exploitable 
potential for Laos’ hydropower resources is 23,000 MW and well beyond its domestic 
needs.  Hydropower accounts for 98% of Laos’ total electricity production capability.  
The Lao PDR realized the benefits of their indigenous hydropower potential and made 
plans to expand their hydropower industry.44  Less than 2% of their hydropower potential 
has been tapped by installed hydropower plants.45  Current hydropower capacity in the 
Lao PDR is 671 MW and expanding.  Between 2001 and 2010, Laos plans on bringing 
six hydropower plants on line for a total capacity increase of about 360 MW with the 
assistance of Chinese hydropower companies.46  The timeline for these six plants have 
fallen behind schedule but not enough to threaten Laos’ energy security.47  Even with the 
current hydropower projects, Laos’ hydropower potential will still be largely untapped.  
Laos’ hydropower is an abundant available alternative to nuclear energy that incorporates 
less risk. 
5. Singapore 
Being a city-state, Singapore has no energy resources indigenous to its very small 
sovereign landmass.  It imports everything that it consumes in terms of energy resources.  
Its electricity generation capacity matches its current demand with a 10% margin.  It 
recently shifted from reliance on oil for electricity production to natural gas in order to 
 
43 CIA, The World Factbook: Laos. 
44 Pholsena and Phonekeo, 4–6. 
45 Somvichith. 
46 Vongsiry and Vanlasy. 
47 Somvichith. 
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alleviate its dependence on oil.48  Singapore’s proximity to natural gas abundant 
Malaysia and Indonesia makes this form of energy ideal for Singapore’s electricity 
needs.49  Singapore has no indigenous available alternative energy sources, but sits 
astride the transport route of oil and natural gas in the region.  While this makes 
Singapore’s access to natural gas diversified and reliable, it does nothing to alleviate its 
dependence on imported energy resources.  All these factors together contribute to make 
nuclear energy more favorable to Singapore, if for no other reason than to relieve 
dependency on exter
D. POLITICAL WILL 
The endeavor to develop nuclear energy will require state sponsorship, which 
requires that states commit to effectively and competently running a complex technical 
program.  This commitment is normally embodied in the form of a government agency 
responsible for nuclear energy actions.  The more committed countries have well 
developed government agencies with the adequate level of administrative and technical 
capability to get the job done.  This commitment often also requires the support of the 
populace and/or significant actors in a nation’s political arena.  This includes politicians, 
activist/interest groups and any other entities that have a voice in government (these 
issues will become more significant in later cases).  Political will is also affected by 
electricity demand and available alternatives.  Together these two factors create a sense 
of need within the country.  Political actors evaluate this need with other national 
interests or in some cases with their own interests.  Together all these things form 
political will for nuclear energy.  In the case of the five countries addressed in this 
chapter, only Brunei and Singapore have demonstrated effective political will over time 
to hold the course necessary on large scale technical activities.  It is questionable whether 
Cambodia, Timor-Leste and the Lao PDR have sufficient political will to translate such a 
complex technical goal into reality.  Political turmoil, lack of government effectiveness, 
 
48 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Singapore, “Geography, People, Government 
and Economy Information,” (2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/id.html (accessed February 9, 2009). 
49 APEC, APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: Singapore, 85–89. 
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insufficient infrastructure, and other inefficiencies rob the political will for anything 
beyond rudimentary infrastructure development in Cambodia, Timor-Leste and the Lao 
PDR.  For these Southeast Asian countries, mustering the political will to pursue nuclear 
energy is presently unachievable.  The hydropower programs in Cambodia and Laos are 
trials which can be used to assess if these two countries can muster sufficient political 
will to accomplish a medium level technical endeavor.  This may be the first step in 
fortifying the political will of these two countries.  For Brunei and Singapore, the analysis 
of political will needs to focus on whether each state has the necessary administrative 
infrastructure to pursue nuclear energy, and what political reason drives the state’s 
decision against pursuing it. 
1. Brunei 
In 2002, energy companies in Brunei established the Brunei Energy Association 
(BEnA) to direct and shape Brunei’s energy industry, and promote conservation and 
efficiency in energy use. Although it is a business group, it has close ties to the 
government: its “honorary adviser” is the minister of energy, and its “honorary president” 
is the deputy minister of industry and primary resources.50  In 2007, the Association 
invited South Korean energy experts to discuss the prospects for nuclear energy in 
Brunei.  Norizah Harun Taylor, the BEnA’s spokesperson for this September 2007 
meeting, stated that it is unlikely that Brunei will pursue nuclear energy in the foreseeable 
future, but she said the country will continue to explore alternative forms of energy for 
when oil reserves run dry.51  The fact that BEnA was evaluating the nuclear energy issue 
indicates a sincere interest in determining applicability and feasibility for the sultanate.  
Since Brunei has not signaled anything more than initial interest, the nuclear debate there 
has not drawn significant attention.  No advocates or opponents to nuclear energy in 
Brunei have come forth to defend their views.  Brunei has no political will to pursue 
nuclear energy because the costs and risks would be difficult to justify with the large 
indigenous oil and gas reserves. 
 
50 Brunei Energy Association, http://www.bena.org.bn/ (object name Profile; accessed February 9, 
2009). 
51 Salam, “BEna to Host Forum on Nuclear Energy.”  
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2. Cambodia 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen announced in September 2008 that nuclear 
energy was “a long distance away for us, but this is our goal.”52  This is a clear indicator 
that Cambodia wants to keep the option of future nuclear energy development open but 
realizes its present limitations.  The fact that no substantial government effort has gone 
into this issue and no state entity has been established or assigned responsibility for 
nuclear energy is a sign that Cambodia lacks the political will to pursue nuclear energy.  
This statement does not conflict with Cambodia’s current energy policy of expanding 
electrification and electricity production based on hydropower sources.  The availability 
of alternatives contributes to Cambodia’s political decision to abstain from nuclear 
energy at present.  The government is focused on the more convenient solution that 
hydropower offers because it does not need the level of administrative and technical 
effort necessary in a nuclear energy program. 
3. Timor-Leste 
No political will to pursue nuclear energy exists in Timor-Leste.  The fledgling 
government of Timor-Leste is focused on fundamental infrastructure and restoring basic 
services like security, electricity and water as rapidly as possible, and cannot be bothered 
with ventures requiring such high startup costs.  The current government structure has no 
agency responsible for such a technically complex endeavor. 
4. Laos 
The Lao PDR has not made any statements of intent concerning nuclear energy 
development; however, the Lao vice Prime Minister, Bounhang Vorachith, defended the 
national sovereignty of every country to pursue peaceful nuclear energy in the face of 
global energy pressures.53  Like its Cambodian neighbor, the leaders of the Lao PDR are 
 
52 Ker Munthit, “Cambodia Eyes Nuclear Plant for Electricity,” Associated Press, September 28, 
2008, www.ap.org/ (accessed December 30, 2008). 
53 Geoffrey Gunn, “Southeast Asia’s Looming Nuclear Power Industry,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: 
Japan Focus, posted on February 11, 2008, http://www.japanfocus.org/_Geoffrey_Gunn-
Southeast_Asia_s_Looming_Nuclear_Power_Industry (accessed January 15, 2009). 
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more focused on rudimentary development and hydropower rather than nuclear energy.  
No state agency exists in the Lao PDR to take on the nuclear energy issue, and the Laos 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (the front agency for Lao energy programs) has not been 
given this task.  Electricity demand and availability of alternatives plays a significant role 
in shaping Lao’s political decision to not consider nuclear energy.  All indicators point to 
a lack of political will to pursue nuclear energy by the Lao PDR leadership because the 
risk is not worth the gain since hydropower can cover the country’s electricity demand 
for years to come. 
5. Singapore 
Singapore is a country whose leadership has shown credible political will 
throughout its history.  Singapore stands apart from other Southeast Asia countries in that 
it has expressed reservations about nuclear energy within the region.  These reservations 
are externally directed and not unfounded.  Singapore is susceptible to trans-boundary 
environmental threats like the Southeast Asian haze resulting from slash and burn land 
clearing in Indonesia.  Such irresponsible behavior, if allowed to penetrate nuclear energy 
program, may result in a catastrophic event.  Singapore is less willing to take on the 
burden of such an event since it will not reap any of the benefits.  In 2007 Singapore’s 
Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, expressed concerns over the region's nuclear energy 
ambitions.  He reiterated that all parties must fully understand the risks involved, and that 
the regulations and standards must be made clear and strictly adhered to.54 
As for utilizing nuclear energy for its own electricity need, Singapore is an 
unlikely candidate but has not completely ruled out the prospects.  Singapore’s proximity 
to gas rich Malaysia and Indonesia coupled with its location astride the ocean transit lane 
between East Asian and the Persian Gulf makes gas and oil power plants ideal.55  But its 
reputation as a “clean” city is pressing Singapore politically to explore alternatives to 
fossil fuels.  The major obstacle to Singapore’s interest in nuclear energy stems from the 
30 km safety standoff from urban areas.  Singapore’s limited landmass makes meeting 
 
54 Gunn, “Southeast Asia’s Looming Nuclear Power Industry.”  
55 Ibid. 
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this requirement impossible.  Singapore contemplated moving to an off-shore land 
reclamation site to meet this requirement, but it was determined that any viable off-shore 
site would be within 30 km of the Malaysian coast.  Although the coast may not be 
considered an urban area, the presence of an off-shore nuclear site may be subject to 
Malaysian criticism and objection.  Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has admitted that any 
attempt at nuclear power by Singapore would entail cooperation with Malaysia in order 
to be viable.56  So in Singapore’s case, its political will alone will not be sufficient to 
press the issue of nuclear energy, as it would have to convince neighboring Malaysia to 
cooperate and would need to rely on Malaysian politics to see this task through.  These 
limitations on the nuclear energy issue drives Singapore’s political will away from such a 
venture. 
E. ADEQUATE MEANS OF PRODUCTION TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR 
POWER 
With the exception of Brunei and Singapore the countries in this category face a 
near impossible obstacle to nuclear energy development in the means of production.  
Nuclear plants must be constructed to withstand the potentially inhospitable environment 
present in Southeast Asia as well as the torturous operating conditions associated with 
power generation through fission.  This means skilled labor and lots of money.  
Cambodia, Timor-Leste and the Lao PDR are going to have a difficult time trying to 
amass sufficient technical labor and capital to pursue nuclear energy because they are 
generally poor.  The issue of adequate means of production to develop nuclear energy is 
also an application of opportunity costs.  It would be nearly impossible to justify 
investment in nuclear energy when the payoffs from pouring those same resources into 
other pressing issues would have a more immediate and significant impact.  With the 
onset of the current global recession (2009), opportunity cost for these three countries 
becomes even larger.  Since available capital will become scarcer, efficient and effective 
 
 
56 Lee Kwan Yew, Transcript of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s Dialogue with Singapore Energy 
Conference on November 4 2008, Raffles City Convention Centre, http://www.news.gov.sg (accessed 
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use of it becomes that much more important.  For this reason, the available means to 
develop nuclear energy in Cambodia, Timor-Leste and the Lao PDR will not be 
discussed.  Instead this section will only examine Brunei and Singapore. 
1. Brunei 
As mentioned previously, Brunei is small but very wealthy.  Its GDP per capita is 
far higher than the average developing countries within the region because of its 
relatively low population and relatively high oil and gas exports.  It is not difficult for this 
country to amass capital.  According to the World Bank, Brunei’s GDP in 2006 was 
$11.6 billion.57  The CIA World Factbook estimated Brunei’s GDP in purchase power 
parity (PPP) terms in 2008 at $20.65 billion.58  These numbers are small when compared 
to other industrial nations but its GDP per capita from the same sources are $26,930 and 
$54,100 respectively.  This indicates that this nation has a lot of capital available for 
investment.  Brunei isn’t looking to invest in nuclear energy because of its large oil and 
gas reserves, but the capital is available if it changes its mind.59 
Brunei is considered an industrialized nation, albeit a small one, because of its oil 
exports industry, service industry and growing value-added industry.  A majority of these 
industries are technology- and engineering- heavy fields.  This indicates that Brunei has a 
skilled work force capable of handling advanced technological issues and/or has 
sufficient wealth to outsource problems that cannot be handled indigenously.  It is also 
looking to improve this already competent work force through more training and 
education funded by its oil and gas revenues.60  All this would suggest that Brunei has 
sufficient labor resources to pursue something as technical as nuclear energy if it chooses. 
 
57 The World Bank, “Key Development Data and Statistic,” The World Bank Data and Statistic, 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html/ (accessed February 23, 2009). 
58 CIA, The World Factbook: Brunei. 
59 DOE, “Country Analysis Brief: Brunei.” 
60 CIA, The World Factbook: Brunei. 
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2. Singapore 
Like Brunei, Singapore’s GDP in total dollar amount does not significantly draw 
attention, but when broken down to a per capita value, it speaks volumes at $52,900 in 
2008.61  Singapore has built its economy not based on natural resource wealth but on 
geographic location and sound financial policies.  It is strategically located at the mouth 
of the Straits of Malacca, the predominant sea route between Asia and Europe and the 
Middle East.  This strategic location coupled with its savvy financial policies made 
Singapore an ideal entrepot in Southeast Asia.  And as such, it has sufficient capital to 
invest in large technical projects such as nuclear energy.  Other mitigating factors have 
precluded Singapore from making such an investment. 
Along with sufficient capital, Singapore also has a technically advanced work 
force of medium to high skill laborers.  Singapore’s industries include technology- and 
engineering- heavy fields such as: oil refinement, petro-chemical production, consumer 
electronics, information technology, pharmaceuticals and medical technology.  The 
presence of these industries run by Singapore’s relatively small work force is an indicator 
of how rich this country is in medium and high skilled labor.  It would not be difficult for 
Singapore to muster the necessary technical labor to pursue a nuclear energy project if it 
overcame political hurdles and its land constraints. 
F. TECHNICAL CAPACITY 
The technical capacity aspect of nuclear power goes beyond obtaining medium 
and high skilled labor for the construction of a nuclear power plant.  It deals with the 
knowledge, proficiency and training of the operators and administrators to run a nuclear 
program safely.  Acquiring and maintaining these skill sets in Southeast Asia requires 
significant investment in human capital on the part of the state and its public.  Legions of 
scientists, engineers and administrative bureaucrats trained in the nuclear field must be 
either grown or outsourced.  Outsourcing an entire nuclear energy program is 
inconceivably expensive and unrealistic.  This leaves building the capability 
 
61 CIA, The World Factbook: Singapore. 
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domestically.  Outside help in establishing this technical capacity is not unrealistic and 
will be the most likely method by which a country acquires this capability.  A country is 
more likely to pursue nuclear energy when it has higher levels of technical capacity. 
Of the five countries evaluated in this chapter, it is obvious that Timor-Leste does 
not have the technical capacity to pursue nuclear energy based on the current conditions 
of this emerging country.  The complete absence of technical/professional or advanced 
academic communities within Timor-Leste is a sign that it has significant ways to go 
before looking into such ventures.62  Cambodia and Laos present a different scenario.  
Both countries are relatively poor and underdeveloped, but both countries are also 
undergoing major infrastructure development projects dealing with energy as discussed in 
the section on availability of alternatives.63  The experience and benefits in building a 
hydropower program and electrification projects throughout the country will improve the 
skill sets for maintaining and operating complex technical programs.  That experience 
coupled with adequate training from technology holders and/or the IAEA can result in 
sufficient technical capacity.  At present, none of these countries possesses the technical 
capacity for nuclear energy because they have not acquired the know-how from the IAEA 
or other technology holders and have yet to prove themselves with their hydropower 
programs. 
A good indicator of whether or not a country has invested in technical capacity for 
nuclear energy is an evaluation of the technical cooperation projects that country has 
undertaken with the IAEA.  At present, Brunei, Timor-Leste, Cambodia and Laos have 
not participated in the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation (TC) program.64  This is another 
independent indication that these countries do not have the technical capacity to pursue 
nuclear energy.  The IAEA is internationally recognized as the custodian of nuclear 
technology for peaceful applications.  When dealing with technology that can spiral to 
 
62 The World Bank, Project Paper on a Proposed Grant in the Amount; CIA, The World Factbook: 
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64 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) database, http://www-TC project.iaea.org/TC 
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applications involving weapons of mass destruction, obtaining that technology 
legitimately and through channels with respected safeguards is the only way to avoid 
international scrutiny and negative attention.  In the case of these four counties, it is very 
unlikely that they would have pursued other less scrupulous avenues of acquiring 
technical capacity for nuclear energy, making the IAEA their primary source if they were 
looking to pursue nuclear technology.   
Singapore is the only country of the five in this chapter who has participated in 
the IAEA’s TC program.  It has completed or is currently participating in 26 TC projects, 
17 of which are essential for nuclear energy application.  Of those 17, the majority deals 
with nuclear and atomic physics which has other academic applications beyond nuclear 
energy.  Singapore has not participated in any TC projects that would train its people to 
handle the nuclear fuel cycle or waste management, a field critical to any nuclear energy 
program.65  The combination of the IAEA TC projects in which Singapore has 
participated indicates that this technologically advanced country has not invested itself in 
acquiring the technical capacity to pursue nuclear energy.  This is to say that, at present, 
Singapore does not have sufficient technical capacity for developing a nuclear energy 
program.  Based on the level of technical competence Singapore has demonstrated, it 
could develop the technical capacity for nuclear energy in very short order if it chooses. 
G. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
All Southeast Asian countries have accepted that nuclear energy requires 
significant amounts of technical knowledge and resources.  For those countries not 
pursuing nuclear energy, international support for the development of nuclear energy is 
irrelevant.  However, all these countries with the exception of Timor-Leste are members 
to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA safeguards and additional 
protocol, and the Bangkok treaty establishing a Southeast Asia nuclear weapons free zone 
(SEANWFZ).  All five countries are a signature to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
 
65 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) database. 
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(CTBT).66  The significance of keeping with this international norm of nonproliferation 
is that it puts these countries in good stead with the IAEA and international assistance for 
nuclear energy development, if it were to be pursued, would be more forthcoming.  
Regardless of whether the international community is willing or unwilling to provide 
technical assistance pertaining to nuclear energy, the five countries in this chapter for one 
or more reasons have decided that they are not interested. 
It is important to recognize that South Korea has already demonstrated a 
willingness to cooperate with Brunei in the nuclear energy field when Brunei showed 
interest.  In September 2007, Brunei hosted a forum to discuss applicability of nuclear 
energy and invited South Korean experts to discuss safety, processes, reliability, supply 
and feasibility of nuclear energy.67  South Korea is a regional nuclear energy user who is 
looking to develop an exportable nuclear industry.  Japan is pursuing the same goal.68 
H. CONCLUSION OF EACH COUNTRY’S DECISION 
The combination of the six factors analyzed for the five countries that have 
abstained from nuclear energy clarifies the basis of their decisions.  Some factors 
dominated over others in different countries and each arrived at their own decision based 
on the impacts of these factors. 
1. Brunei 
Brunei’s electricity demand is relatively small and at present is well within its 
electricity production capacity from an indigenous source of natural gas.69  Brunei is 
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facing increasing energy pressures caused by increased urbanization70 and expansion of 
the country’s industry toward value-added goods and services.71  However the expected 
growth in electricity demand for the next two decades is still well within the nation’s 
planned energy sector expansion.  Brunei has an abundance of natural gas as an 
alternative to nuclear energy for electricity.  It is estimated that Brunei’s natural gas 
reserves is capable of absorbing the expected growth in demand and will last well beyond 
2030.72  Low to moderate electricity demand coupled with abundant availability of 
alternatives present Brunei with a clear reason to abstain from nuclear energy. 
2. Cambodia 
Cambodia’s primary electricity demand problem is its lack of distribution 
infrastructure followed by generation capacity as a lesser problem.  Its poor infrastructure 
makes the cost of electricity in Cambodia one of the highest in the region.73  At present, 
Cambodia is focused on development of hydropower because of its capacity and 
inexhaustible/renewable nature.  The hydropower potential alone in Cambodia is 
sufficient to meet future electricity demands projected at the pre-recession rates for the 
next couple of decades.  This could resolve Cambodia’s electricity production problem 
but does nothing for the infrastructure issue.  In terms of opportunity costs, Cambodia’s 
means of production (capital and labor) would be better spent on hydropower, than on 
pioneering nuclear energy.  Cambodia surely cannot do both.  The combination of low 
energy demand, readily available alternatives, and limited means of production makes it 
highly unlikely that Cambodia will reverse its decision to abstain from nuclear energy. 
 
70 CIA, The World Factbook: Brunei. 
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72 CIA, The World Factbook: Brunei; APEC, APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: 
Brunei Darussalam, 7-10. 
73 United Nations, “Draft: Cambodia Energy Sector Strategy,” 5-14. 
 36
                                                
3. Timor-Leste 
Timor-Leste is still plagued with chaos and political instability from its birth as an 
independent nation a decade ago.  Little political will exists for anything other than 
rebuilding the country’s basic infrastructure.  Like Cambodia, Timor-Leste’s electricity 
demand problem is not one of production but of distribution infrastructure.  Both 
countries rely almost entirely on imported diesel to power small generators attached to 
inefficient grids.  So like Cambodia, the cost of electricity in Timor-Leste is one of the 
most expensive within the region.74  Although oil and natural gas have recently been 
discovered in Timor-Leste waters, the benefits of this alternative energy source will most 
likely come in the form of revenue and will not be realized for some time.75  The Dili 
government is focused on fundamental infrastructure and basic state reconstruction, and 
will most likely look to those revenues to do so.  Little capital and labor will be left over 
for projects that do not immediately alleviate the dire conditions in Timor-Leste, let alone 
a program like nuclear energy.  Timor-Leste is lacking in all factors to pursue nuclear 
energy, the most significant of which is the lack of political will resulting from a tenuous 
fledgling government. 
4. Laos 
Laos’s relatively small electricity demand compared to its expanding hydropower 
based generation capacity means that it does not need to consider nuclear power as an 
alternative source of energy.76  Domestic electricity consumption is growing at a 
manageable rate as urbanization rates are low and Laos’s primary industry is resource 
extraction which is not electricity heavy.  Hydropower plants produce enough electricity 
for domestic use and for export to its neighbors.77  Laos is looking to capitalize on its 
hydropower resource and has initiated plans to expand its hydro-electric capacity.78  In 
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the case of Laos, low electricity demand and ready availability of an alternative energy 
source are the main drivers in its decision to abstain from nuclear energy. 
5. Singapore 
Singapore is a unique case among the five countries in this chapter.  Its electricity 
demand profile supports seeking a reliable large-scale electricity source like nuclear 
power79 and it has no viable, indigenous alternatives.  It is a rich industrialized country 
with a history of technical cooperation with the IAEA, so it has sufficient means of 
production and could rapidly gain the technical capacity if it so chooses.  International 
support would most likely be forthcoming if Singapore were to pursue the endeavor of 
nuclear energy.  Singapore’s major obstacle to nuclear energy is its inability to comply 
with a 30 km safety standoff range between nuclear power plants and urban areas.  This 
limitation results in a political issue that cannot be resolved without coordination and 
cooperation from Singapore’s neighbor Malaysia.80  At present, Singapore does not have 
the political will to pursue nuclear energy.  Singapore has also demonstrated anxiety 
about its neighbors developing nuclear energy and its susceptibility to trans-border 
environmental issues. 
6. Closing Summary 
In this section, the factors of electricity demand, availability of alternatives, and 
adequate means of production played more significant roles than their counterparts.  The 
main energy problem in Cambodia, Laos, and Timor-Leste is a lack of infrastructure to 
distribute electricity.  Additional generation capacity from nuclear energy would be 
nearly useless until a more comprehensive distribution network is established and 
infrastructure is improved.  These three countries also lack sufficient means of production 
to spend on such a high cost of entry project.  What little capital and skilled labor these 
countries have would be better spent on constructing and managing a distribution system 
and infrastructure than on developing a nuclear energy capability.  Cambodia, Laos, 
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80 Lee Kuan Yew. 
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Brunei and eventually Timor-Leste have available alternative energy sources.  Brunei and 
Singapore are the only ones with sufficient means of production available for nuclear 
energy endeavors, but have overwhelming reasons to not pursue it.  
Political will and technical capacity, although important, play only secondary 
roles.  Political will was heavily influenced by the three dominant factors discussed in the 
previous paragraph.  Because these countries had decided to abstain for sound reasons, 
there was little public debate in any of them.  No political actors in these countries 
weighed in on this issue.  Without influences beyond need, a combination of electricity 
demand and available alternatives, political will behaved like a dependent variable and 
followed need.  Although the five countries in this category vary in degree of 
authoritarianism, they all complied with the pragmatic needs of their populace, a 
similarity the global community may find relieving.  In other countries to be assessed 
later, political will may play a more aggressive or significant role, and may be contrary to 
some public views.  All five countries lack sufficient technical capacity to pursue nuclear 
energy, but Singapore could acquire it in relatively short order.  This stands in contrast to 
Cambodia and Laos and in very sharp contrast to Timor-Leste.  Brunei sits somewhere in 
between Singapore and the others in technical capacity, but it is closer to Singapore than 
the others.  The factor of international support had very little relevance to these five 
countries since the dominating factors overwhelmingly drive them to not pursue nuclear 
energy. 
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III. COUNTRIES THAT MAY POTENTIALLY PURSUE 
NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE NEAR FUTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Burma, Malaysia and the Philippines have the potential to be the next countries in 
Southeast Asia to seriously consider pursuing nuclear energy.  At present, these countries 
are not developing a nuclear energy program, but circumstances in each country are 
bringing them closer to it.  Burma has announced its intention to develop a research 
reactor in order to study nuclear technology for future applications in energy 
generation.81  Malaysia has an “emerging interest” in nuclear energy and may review the 
decision to pursue it again in the following decade.82  The Philippines reviews its 
position on nuclear energy every time a new president enters office, and so far has 
maintained the status quo against using nuclear energy.83  The six factors affecting the 
decision on nuclear energy will provide insight into the question of nuclear energy for 
these countries.  Burma and Malaysia have made it clear that they intend to explore the 
possibilities of nuclear energy in the next couple of decades and will most likely start a 
nuclear energy program of some sort.  The Philippines has a firm position against the use 
of nuclear energy based on problems with the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), but 
mounting energy pressures are forcing it to re-evaluate this position. 
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The need for nuclear energy can be assessed in two parts, electricity demand and 
the supply of available alternatives.  These two factors are closely related and had a 
profound impact on the factor of political will in the previous chapter.  Need still play a 
part in political will in the three countries analyzed in this chapter, but other domestic 
factors specific to each country will play a larger role in shaping political will.  The 
means of production and the technical capacity of these countries are relatively 
transparent in favor of or against nuclear energy.  International support comes down to 
transparency as the gate keeper to availability of assistance from technology holders. 
B. ELECTRICITY DEMAND 
Gauging electricity demand is the first part of assessing the need for nuclear 
energy.  As in the countries discussed in the previous chapter, electricity demand in these 
countries is driven by increased urbanization, commerce, value-added industries and 
manufacturing.  The ability to meet rising demand for electricity is an essential element 
in maintaining growth and development in these countries, and is a vital goal for their 
respective governments.  Nuclear energy can help meet electricity demand in these 
countries by providing a large scale energy solution to the generation problem and relieve 
fossil fuel dependency.  The larger a country’s electricity demand, the more it is likely to 
favor adopting nuclear power to break the dependency on fossil fuels for electricity 
generation. 
1. Burma 
The CIA World Factbook estimates that Burma’s electricity generation capacity is 
about 30% greater than its consumption rate.84  Yet, the Burmese public is still facing 
tremendous energy pressures.  This gap in supply and demand exists because the 
distribution system is not well developed and is not sufficient for Burma’s populace.  The 
Burmese government does nothing to alleviate this pressure because it does not place a 
high priority on improving the lives of the general public and uses this gap as a means to 
 
84 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Burma, “Geography, People, Government and 
Economy Information,” (2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html 
(accessed March 11, 2009). 
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control the country by suppressing those who do not support the regime.  This principle 
was illustrated by the protests and subsequent crackdown in 2007.  This incident started 
as a protest over an unforeseen increase in fuel (gas and diesel) prices imposed by the 
government.85  New electricity generation and distribution infrastructure was built in 
support of the military government’s move to Naypyidaw in 2006.86  Burma is 
continuing to expand its electricity generation capacity, and strives to become a regional 
energy exporter to electricity hungry neighbors.  As of 2008, Burma’s installed 
generation capacity was 1719.9 MW and its peak usage was 1061.2 MW.87  
Unfortunately the benefits of nuclear energy for large scale electricity production will 
only reach those loyal to the Junta government. 
Burma has a large agricultural base and continues to rely on agriculture as a 
significant source of income.88  This trend does not promote urbanization and 
commercial services.  Poor farmers are less likely to eat in restaurants, use a lot of 
electricity based consumer products and shop in department stores.  This means the 
electricity demand from residential and commercial sectors are not expected to grow 
significantly.  The repressive political atmosphere resulting from the Junta’s authoritarian 
government discourages foreign direct investments (FDI) outside of government 
sponsored projects, and the economic policy known as the Burmese way to Socialism 
stifles indigenous private entrepreneurs.  These two conditions limit the level of effective 
industrialization, minimizing the growth of value-added industry and manufacturing 
outside of the Junta’s control.  As a result of Burma’s control-centric state, it has a low 
urbanization rate, a small commercial sector, and limited industry in the private sector.  
 
85 “Hundreds Protest in Myanmar Over Fuel Price Hike,” Forbes, August 19, 2007, 
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Mydans; “Myanmar monk protest contained by Junta forces,” The New York Times, September 28, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/asia/28cnd-myanmar.html (accessed December 29, 2008). 
86 Burma River Network database, http://www.burmariversnetwork.org/ (object name “Upper and 
Lower Paunglaung Dams;” accessed March 10, 2009). 
87 Burma River Network database, http://www.burmariversnetwork.org/ (object name Country Report 
on Progress of Power Development Plans and Transmission Interconnection Projects: Myanmar power 
point presentation, November 21, 2008; accessed March 13, 2009). 
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This makes Burma’s electricity demand small.  The shortage of electricity experience by 
the general public is centered on distribution limits imposed by the Junta and not by 
generation capacity.  Nuclear energy will not solve the underlining cause of this gap, but 
the Junta government may still decide to pursue it for their own nefarious ends. 
2. Malaysia 
Malaysia’s future electricity demand is driven by strong growth in the industrial 
and the residential sectors.  The electricity demand increase in industry originates from 
Malaysia’s shift from energy-intensive to non-energy-intensive industries.  Non-energy-
intensive industries tend to be more value-added industries, which use more electricity 
than other energy sources (oil, natural gas, steam, etc.).  As Malaysia’s “economy moves 
further up the value-added production chain”89 and takes this next-step in 
industrialization, the urbanization rate goes up and the general standard of living 
improves.  This trend drives residential electricity consumption up with increased 
demands for appliances such as refrigerators and air-conditioners.  A counter effect to 
this driver of electricity demand is improved efficiency in these appliances.  This counter 
is only significant enough to slow the rate of rising electricity consumption, not reverse it 
because of the high rate of urbanization.  Malaysia’s electricity demand is growing with 
the country’s continued development while its natural gas reserves are shrinking.  It is 
looking to coal to carry the near-term future load of electricity generation while exploring 
alternatives to meet the long-term demand.90  From this point of view, Malaysia’s 
electricity demand favors a decision to pursue nuclear energy. 
3. The Philippines 
Electricity demand in the Philippines is significant and growing.  The Philippines 
has already committed to nuclear energy once in the past under the Marcos regime during 
 
89 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Malaysia, “Geography, People, Government and 
Economy Information,” (2009). https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html/ 
(accessed March 13, 2009). 
90 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: 
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the 1970s oil shock, but turned away from it because of corruption in the construction 
process and site location in the proximity of a dormant volcano and fault lines.  The issue 
of electricity demand did not improve and aging power generation plants began to fail, 
resulting in the numerous power blackouts in the 1980s.91  Today, electricity in the 
Philippines is supplied primarily by coal (40%), natural gas (30%) and hydropower 
(16%).  This capacity outpaces consumption by about 10%.92  Future electricity demand 
growth in the Philippines is driven by the residential sector, with the commercial and 
industrial sectors in second and third place.  This trend is caused by the social and 
economic developments centered on the Manila metropolitan area and the resulting 
urbanization increase. 
In 2002, the Philippines was 60% urbanized, by 2030 this number is expected to 
increase to 76%.  Increase in urbanization raises the level of electricity demand by 
residents.  Commercial sector consumption of electricity also goes up as it grows to 
support the expanding urban residence.  Industrial development increased the 
consumption of electricity as Philippine industry modernizes and increased the use of 
electrical equipment.93  These electricity demand trends make nuclear energy more 
appealing as an alternative large-scale source of electricity.  For this reason, every 
administration that has come to power since Aquino has reviewed the country’s policy on 
nuclear energy. 
C. AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SUPPLIES 
The second part in assessing the need for nuclear energy is in the supply of 
alternatives to nuclear energy.  If Burma, Malaysia or the Philippines have available 
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alternatives to nuclear energy for large scale electricity production, it may make the 
pursuit of nuclear energy less urgent.  The fewer alternatives a country has, the more 
likely it will commit to nuclear energy.  In similar fashion, as the available alternative 
gets closer to depletion, the more attractive nuclear energy will become. 
1. Burma 
Burma is endowed with an abundance of indigenous oil, natural gas, coal and 
hydropower potential.94  The junta has prioritized the majority of these resources for 
export instead of domestic use, even though the general populace is in dire need of fuel 
for electricity, cooking needs and transportation.  Burma’s natural gas exports account for 
over 40% of its export revenues with energy-hungry Thailand as its major customer.95  
The revenues from such exports are not going back into state development to relieve the 
energy pressures of the general populace (no improvements in the electricity distribution 
system for Rangoon).  This trend contributes to Burma’s reputation as one of the most 
corrupt governments in the world.96 
At present, its available electricity capacity is generated from hydropower (over 
50%), natural gas (32%) and geothermal steam (16.5%).  Like many of its mainland 
neighbors (Laos and Cambodia), Burma has many rivers and is rich in hydropower 
potential.  The hydropower potential within the country has not reached its limit and 
future expansion in hydropower is planned in coordination with India, China and 
Thailand.  Burma has at least 29 dam projects under construction with its partners.  The 
additional generation capacity from these combined projects will add 19,413.8 MW to the 
existing 1,719.9 MW.  This is an increase of over ten times the current capacity, all from 
hydropower.  And since hydropower is considered renewable, Burma will be able to 
sustain this generation capacity nearly indefinitely, as long as it invests in infrastructure 
 
94 Joint United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank Energy Sector Assessment 
Program, Burma Issues and Options in the Energy Sector, Report No. 5416-BA, 1985. 
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96 Transparency International, 2008 Corruption Perception Index, http://www.transparency.org/ 
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maintenance.  No expansion in other forms of electricity generation is planned.97  Couple 
this with Burma’s largely rural population and it is easily assessed that Burma’s 
electricity generation capacity will continue to outpace its demand, even in light of its 
plans to export energy.  Burma could easily solve the energy issues for its people if it 
chose to do so.  The alternatives to nuclear energy available to Burma are abundant and 
more cost effective should Burma decide to tap into them for electricity for its general 
populace.  This factor should greatly reduce Burma’s interest in nuclear energy. 
2. Malaysia 
Malaysia’s available alternatives to nuclear energy are natural gas and coal.  Oil’s 
share of electricity production was reduced in the 1990s and gas was made the primary 
source of electricity generation.  In 2010, it is expected that natural gas will account for 
56% of electricity generation and coal for 36%.  By 2030, coal is expected to surpass 
natural gas as the primary means of electricity generation.  This transition is in response 
to predictions that natural gas reserves in Malaysia will be depleted by 2038 at the 2005 
consumption rate.  With the current outlook on natural gas depletion, coal-based 
electricity was expected to fill the role as the primary electricity producer for the decades 
to come.98  Coal demand in Malaysia is fastest growing of the fossil fuels, and will make 
Malaysia more reliant on imported coal.  Malaysia is already a net importer of coal to 
make up for the gap in indigenous production.  The plan to make coal the primary source 
of electricity is on shaky ground as indicated by the jump in the price of coal in June of 
2008.99 
In anticipation of rising demand and declining supply, Malaysia has initiated 
conservation policies coupled with policies to developing renewable energy sources that 
are reliable and cost-effective.100  In 2006, the Malaysian Prime Minister stated that the 
 
97 Burma River Network database, Country Report on Progress of Power Development Plans and 
Transmission Interconnection Projects. 
98 APEC, APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: Malaysia, 49-53. 
99 Sarban Singh, “Malaysia to Use Nuclear Energy by 2023,” The Star Online, September 20, 2008, 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/9/20/nation/2080863&sec=nation (accessed 16 Mar 2008). 
100 APEC, APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: Malaysia, 49-53. 
 48
uclear 
energy.102   
3. Philippines 
e rising demand for coal has increased the overall import dependence in 
total am
                                                
government of Malaysia will reduce dependence on fossil fuels and increase the use of 
renewable energy sources.101  The limited availability of Malaysia’s alternative does 
buy it time, and makes a large-scale energy alternative important but not urgent.  
Malaysian officials have stated that at present there is no need for civilian n
As alternatives to nuclear energy, the Philippines has limited amounts of oil, 
natural gas and coal, with natural gas and coal as the current fuels of choice.  By 2010, 
APEC expects coal to account for 40% of the Philippines’ electricity production and 
natural gas for 30%.  Coal was chosen as the fossil fuel of choice because of its 
abundance domestically and regionally, and because it was cheaper than other fossil 
fuels.  The Philippine is already dependent on imported coal for its installed generation 
capacity.  The coal price jump in 2008 has shattered this prospect by increasing the cost 
of imported coal, and puts some pressure on the Philippines to look for large scale 
electricity production elsewhere.  Indigenous natural gas and coal production have 
increased to improve the level of self-sufficiency to just over 50%, but this effort did not 
significantly alleviate Philippine reliance on imported coal and gas because consumption 
also went up.  Th
ount.103 
Other sources of electricity available to the Philippines are geothermal power and 
hydropower.  The Philippines has extensive geothermal resources that could potentially 
make the Philippines the world’s largest producer and user of geothermal energy.  
Increasing electricity consumption is stressing the country’s present sources of electric 
power, forcing the Manila to consider expansion into alternatives like geothermal.  In 
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een, the chance that it will look back to nuclear power for 
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D. POLITICAL WILL 
                                                
2007, the installed geothermal capacity was 2,027.07 MW.  An increase of about 820 
MW is expected by 2014.  Although these generation capacities seem large, it is 
equivalent to about one nuclear power plant.  It has a little more installed hydropower 
capacity at 3,257 MW. 104  These numbers are still small when compared to the 15.5 GW 
of installed generation capacity.105  The Government of the Philippines is also pursuing 
policies promoting exploration, conservation, efficiency improvements and electricity 
sector reforms.  T
t close it. 
Although the Philippines has available alternatives for electricity production, its 
consumption growth is quickly catching up to its generation capacity, especially on 
Mindanao.  Additional generation capacity is needed and it is expected to be in the form 
of coal power.  The Exploration for new sources of indigenous coal and natural gas will 
help improve Philippine energy self-sufficiency.  The levels of success of this effort will 
play a big role in closing the energy supply and demand gap.106  Current plans to expand 
geothermal energy also offer some relief to the energy pressures.  The current available 
alternatives can sustain the Philippines at its present development and consumption rate.  
So long as the Philippines can maintain their coal and gas production to keep up with 
demand as they have b
The level of political will for developing nuclear energy varies a great deal for the 
three countries in this chapter, with Burma and the Philippines at the opposite ends of the 
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is a factor independent of need as defined by electricity demand or available 
alternat
 must be examined to 
determine if they can muster political will behind nuclear energy. 
1. Burma 
spectrum and Malaysia in the middle.  One reason for this variation is the level of 
democracy and level of benevolence a particular government has towards its people.  An 
authoritarian government will have an easier time making the national decision to pursue 
nuclear energy and directing its national effort toward developing nuclear power, because 
it tends to ignore the needs and political voice of its people and it can brutally suppress 
the opposition.  In the previous chapter, each country assessed had benevolent 
governments that took the welfare and views of their people into consideration when 
making policy.  This chapter assesses possibly the only country in the region with a 
government so detached from its populace as to completely disregard their wellbeing.  Of 
course the country in question is Burma.  For Burma, political will for nuclear technology 
development 
ives. 
A more open or liberal state may have to contend with domestic opinion on 
nuclear power.  For Malaysia and the Philippines, mustering the political will to pursue 
nuclear energy requires more of the people’s consent and may be more difficult because 
of other indigenous conditions.  In the case of Malaysia, political will is driven by need as 
defined by electricity demand and the availability of alternatives.  However, to improve 
the chance of successfully mustering political will behind nuclear energy, Malaysia is 
approaching this decision very deliberately and cautiously.  The Philippines has some 
experience with nuclear energy in the past, and this experience has left a bitter political 
after-taste for such a program.  The ability to muster political will for nuclear energy in 
the Philippines faces a large domestic opposition.  Political will seems to be a very 
significant factor contributing to the nuclear energy decision of the three countries in this 
chapter.  The domestic environment for each of these countries
Power and control appears to be the driver for the Junta's actions.  Any decision it 
has made concerning economics and trade has lined the pockets of its elites and/or has 
been mismanaged to the point of minimal benefits for its people.  Similarly, its energy 
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policies strengthen the Junta’s power base at the expense of its people.  Can Burma 
muster sufficient political will to pursue nuclear energy?  If Burma has proven anything, 
it is that it has more political will than judgment.  This authoritarian regime has extracted 
labor and resources from its people in support of numerous state objectives without 
consideration for the human cost.  Burma has a relatively robust electricity production 
capacity compared to its consumption rate.  This gap is self imposed.  It rations electricity 
to its public, but can sell it across the border to its neighbors.  For Burma, mustering 
political will is only a matter of getting the elite power-holders to agree, and they have 
been in agreement on nuclear development since 2001 when the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, under U Thaung, expressed interest in a research reactor.  The development 
of a 10 MW research reactor in central Burm
s atomic energy agency, Rosatom. 107 
The factors of electricity demand and availability of alternative energy resource 
do not justify a decision in favor of nuclear energy.  The political will to pursue a nuclear 
program originates from the core of Junta decision makers and the ultimate intent behind 
this development is unclear.  Burma has a long standing history of opposing nuclear 
weapons and a history almost as long of pursuing peaceful applications of nuclear 
technology.108  Reviving the pursuit of nuclear technology may be a matter of national 
pride or “face” for Burma.  Many of its neighbors have research reactors, and Burma 
might see a research reactor as a step towards becoming a modern nation like its peers.  
Burma is heavily involved in the energy export business for revenue generation.  Nuclear 
energy may be a source of future electricity exports for when its natural gas reserves run 
out.  Burma has a smaller estimated gas reserves than neighboring Malaysia, which is 
expected to deplete its reserves by 2038.  Malaysia extracts five tim
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Even if these are the real reasons behind Burma’s nuclear aspirations, as usual, 
the Junta is in keeping with its track record of making things worse (or appear worse) 
than they already are.  The inconsistency between Burma’s energy needs and its desire 
for nuclear technology has many experts worried.  Is it possible that Burma has departed 
from its traditional posture on non-proliferation and is planning to develop nuclear 
weapons?  Is it borrowing a page from the North Korean playbook on blackmail-
diplomacy?  The fact that Burma is developing a nuclear program with unclear intentions 
is strategically destabilizing for the region, but Andrew Selth warns of alarmist inflation 
of Burma’s potential of becoming a rogue state armed with nuclear weapons.  Selth based 
his conclusion on several pieces of evidence.  First the majority of alarmist writings 
originate from Burmese exiles or those who may have an alternative agenda in painting 
Burma in worse light than it really is.  Second, Burma is willing to cooperate with the 
IAEA in its nuclear program and willing to comply with all protocols.  It was the IAEA 
that turned away from Burma’s nuclear program.  Finally, it is a long way from a 
research reactor to weaponization.  A research reactor has numerous other peaceful 
applications.109  As the situation exists today, it is unclear what is truly driving Burma’s 
political will for nuclear development, but the fact that Burma is proceeding down this 
path requires close attention without alarmist overreaction. 
2. Malaysia 
Evaluate Malaysia’s electricity demand against its available alternatives and it 
becomes clear that it needs to seriously look at nuclear energy for large scale electricity 
generation in the near future.  When it comes to political will, Malaysia has demonstrated 
that it can make decisions and drive the country down the subsequent path of that 
decision.  An exemplary example of this political will is Malaysia’s response to the 1997 
Asian financial crisis (AFC) in which Malaysia implemented policies opposite to those 
recommended by the IMF in spite of international skepticism.110  This decision by 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir appeared risky, but Malaysia mustered the necessary 
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political will to implement it, and it paid off.  Malaysia’s economy reformed and 
recovered.  This recovery has increased the wealth of Malaysia steadily over the past 
decade.  Malaysia has the ability to muster political will in spades, but can it do so for 
nuclear energy? 
In 2006, Deputy Prime Minister Razak outlined Malaysia’s position that it would 
evaluate the applicability of nuclear energy for future use and that it had at least 15 years 
to do so.  This assessment was probably based on the estimates that natural gas reserves 
would last until about 2038 at the expected consumption rate, and that modern nuclear 
power plants can be constructed more rapidly today.  Malaysia was looking to coal to be 
the major electricity producer by that time if alternatives are pursued.  In the same year, 
Malaysia restructured the Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) 
to facilitate the development of a Malaysian nuclear industry and rebranded it as 
“Nuclear Malaysia,” the Malaysia Nuclear Agency.111  A one MW research reactor at 
Bangi in Selangor was in the works.112  Even with all this effort in the direction of 
nuclear energy, Malaysia continued to refuse accepting nuclear energy as an option for 
electricity production and only admitted to an emerging interest in it.  This was the 
official Malaysian position as late as mid-2008.113  It seems that by the end of 2008, the 
timetable for this effort had shifted to the left.  In response to a jump in coal prices in 
June 2008, the Energy, Water and Communications Minister (Datuk Shaziman Abu 
Mansor) made a statement in September 2008 that Malaysia will have to resort to nuclear 
energy for electricity as early as 2023.114  The nuclear energy issue in Malaysia is 
moving quickly and the domestic debate has not fully matured.  These changes in 
Malaysian policy indicate that it is building political will behind nuclear energy, and that 
it is only a matter of time before it decides to officially pursue nuclear energy. 
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3. Philippines 
Gaining necessary political will to support nuclear energy in the Philippines poses 
a different problem from all the other countries within the region.  The Philippines has 
already committed to nuclear energy once before only to be burned by corruption and 
ineptitude.  The Philippines spent nearly $2 billion on the BNPP contracted during the 
Marcos regime.  This plant has never been activated and has produced zero kilowatts of 
electricity since its construction.  Allegations of corruption and insufficient workmanship 
have brought into question the functionality of the facility.  A 1986 international 
inspection of the plant deemed it unsafe to operate because of proximity to a fault line 
and volcano not because of corner-cutting or insufficient workmanship.  The Philippines 
government has only finished paying off the construction cost to Westinghouse in 2008.   
The Aquino government institutionalized constitutional measures against ever 
using nuclear energy because of this bad experience.115  Overturning these measures 
would be the first step in mustering political will in support of nuclear energy today.  
Since the Aquino administration, the Ramos, Estrada and Arroyo administrations have 
each looked into reviving the nuclear program at the start of their respective 
administrations to ease energy pressures.  Each conducted inspections and assessments of 
the old Bataan plant, but the resulting debate as to the feasibility of bringing this plant to 
operating condition were always inconclusive.  All three administrations have been 
unsuccessful in mustering the necessary political will to adopt nuclear energy thus far.116  
A paradox in policy in the Aquino administration was the transformation of the 
Philippines Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) into the Philippines Nuclear Research 
Institute (PNRI).  The PNRI was responsible for the advancement and regulation of the 
peaceful application of nuclear science and technology in the Philippines to include 
nuclear energy.117  This agency objective clear indicates that Manila did not want to 
completely close the door on nuclear energy even with overwhelming public pressure to 
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do so.  If nuclear energy is to be forever banned from use, why have promotion of nuclear 
energy as an objective in PNRI?  Following the patterns of subsequent Philippines 
presidents, it can be concluded that the action to constitutionally limit the use of nuclear 
energy was the desire of the people while the political leadership dealing directly with the 
global energy pressures cling to nuclear energy as a possible option.  The sole obstacle to 
political will behind nuclear power is the acceptance of the Philippines public. 
As global energy pressures makes electricity more and more expensive, the price 
tag for refurbishing this facility may appear less daunting and more agreeable.  The 
historical experience of this “White Elephant” has built a tremendous obstacle to 
obtaining political will in favor of nuclear energy and the only way this obstacle can be 
overcome is if it becomes cheaper to pursue this option than to continue to buy energy on 
the global market.  At present, this is not the case, so the Philippines will continue to have 
insufficient political will for nuclear energy, but this basic supply and demand 
relationship will eventually catch up. 
E. ADEQUATE MEANS OF PRODUCTION TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR 
POWER 
To pursue nuclear power a country must have a lot of capital and skilled labor.  In 
these Southeast Asia countries, capital and labor are not the big obstacle to nuclear 
energy development as one may expect.  All three countries in this chapter have or can 
acquire very quickly the adequate capital and skilled labor necessary for developing a 
nuclear program.  The more means of production a country has, the more likely it will 
explore nuclear energy as a solution to its energy pressures. 
1. Burma 
Although Burma’s populace is one of the poorest in Southeast Asia, the Junta has 
large amounts of capital from its resource extraction industry.  Burma exports an 
abundance of oil and natural gas to it neighbor Thailand and other Asian countries.  
Revenues from these transactions account for over half of Burma’s export value.  Burma 
also has a strong agricultural and mineral base that accounts for over 50% of its GDP and 
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43% of its export.118  The profits resulted from the exploitation of these resources goes 
into the regime coffer and not back out to its people, retaining a great deal of wealth for 
the Burmese elite.  As discussed in the political will section, the Junta has the authority to 
use this large amount of capital in any way they want with little to no opposition. 
Evidence of Burma’s ability to compile necessary funding for this project 
occurred between 2002 and 2005.  In late 2002, the research reactor project with Russia 
stalled over disagreement on the amount of advance payment.  Rangoon wanted to pay 
only 10% as an advance, while the Moscow wanted a 25% advance payment.  The 
project resumed in 2005 when Rangoon appeared to have mustered sufficient funds.119  
The Junta has Burma’s resource wealth at its disposal without account, and can pour as 
much capital into this effort as it likes 
One would expect that Burma does not have a good indigenous pool of skilled 
labor necessary for developing a nuclear power program.  Its economy is based mainly on 
resource extraction, with little heavy industry and practically no value-added industry.  
This assessment of Burma’s skilled labor pool may be inaccurate.  Burma has completed 
numerous hydropower projects and has many more underway.120  They have been 
receiving technical assistance in these projects from China.  Although the skill sets for 
building a dam is not directly transferable to the skill sets for building a nuclear power 
plant, it does demonstrate that Burma has a workforce that is capable of accomplishing 
large technical construction projects involving energy production.  With outside 
assistance, mainly from the Russians, it is possible that Burma can develop a sufficient 
skilled-labor pool to assemble a Russian research reactor. 
2. Malaysia 
Malaysia is a newly industrialized country with a growing economy.  It is moving 
its economy up to “value-added” goods level in the industrial production chain.  Some 
 
118 U. S. Department of State Databases, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm (object name 
Background Note: Burma; accessed March 13, 2009). 
119 Selth, 7. 
120 Selth, 6-8; Burma River Network database. 
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examples of the value-added fields in which Malaysia is branching out are high-tech 
electronics industries, medical technologies and pharmaceuticals.  As a lesson learned 
from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Malaysia had insulated itself from external 
economic crisis with large foreign exchange reserves and small external debt.121  This 
foresight may alleviate some of the impact of the 2009 global recession on the Malaysian 
economy.  All this indicates that Malaysia should have the ability to amass sufficient 
capital to support a nuclear power program when it decides to officially pursue one. 
Malaysia’s progression up the industrial production chain also means that its 
workforce is becoming better trained and more skilled.  The skill sets at this higher level 
of industrialization is more applicable to nuclear power than skill sets from lower levels 
of industrialization such as resource extraction.  Malaysia’s advancement in technology 
and industry has built a skilled labor pool conducive to pursuing nuclear power, if it 
chooses to do so. 
3. Philippines 
The Philippines has recently completed payment to Westinghouse for a nuclear 
power plant, proving that it can overcome the sufficient capital hurdle.  It took a little less 
than 32 years.  Ironically, this nuclear power plant has not produced any electricity, and 
evaluations on whether or not it is safe to operate are inconclusive.122  The Philippine 
GDP is growing in similar trends to the rest of Southeast Asia at 7% in 2007 and 4.5% in 
2008.  Its strong GDP performance is due to high government spending, a strong service 
sector and large amounts of remittances from millions of Filipinos working abroad.123  
The Philippines past record and present performance indicates that it would be able to 
amass sufficient capital to restart its nuclear energy program if it so chooses.  But having 




121 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Malaysia. 
122 Addison; Quilop. 
123 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Philippines. 
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the Manila will fund another.  Instead, opportunity costs may make it wiser to refurbish 
the existing plant for energy production whether by nuclear or by some other source of 
energy. 
By nuclear industry standards, inconclusive evaluations on whether or not a plant 
is safe to operate amounts to a negative determination because severe potential 
consequences require decision makers to err on the side of caution.  The main issue of 
concern with the BNPP is whether or not sufficiently skilled labor was used during the 
plant’s construction.  When the plant was contracted during the Marcos regime, 
suspicions of corruption and nepotism suggest that although skilled labor was available, 
cheaper unskilled laborers were used in order to skim money into the pockets of the 
project heads.124  Does the Philippines have a sufficiently skilled labor pool to pursue a 
nuclear program today?  The Philippines is an industrialized country with a mixed range 
of industries from pharmaceutical and high-skill industries to low-skill manufacturing 
and agricultural industries.125  Based on this wide range of skill in the labor pool, the 
Philippines should have sufficient skilled labor base to support a nuclear energy program 
again, if it ever overcomes its painful experience with nuclear energy. 
F. TECHNICAL CAPACITY 
Developing a nuclear energy program requires human capital investments in more 
than skilled labor.  The technical capacity aspect of nuclear power deals with the 
knowledge, proficiency and training of the operators and administrators of such a 
program.  Acquiring and maintaining these skills in Burma, Malaysia and the Philippines 
require significant human capital investments on the part of the state and its education 
system.  Scientists, engineers and administrative bureaucrats must be trained to the 
internationally accepted standards of the IAEA.  Quality control is an issue in which 
these countries are notoriously weak.  The BNPP demonstrates this point in the 
Philippines.  Nuclear reactors components must be constructed and assembled to 
withstand the torturous operating conditions of nuclear energy and the potentially 
 
124 Addison; Quilop. 
125 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Philippines. 
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inhospitable environment present in Southeast Asia.  A quality-control regime 
independent of the labor force is essential in starting a nuclear project and in keeping it 
running for years to come.  A country is more likely to pursue nuclear energy when it has 
higher levels of technical capacity.  A country can acquire this technical capacity through 
training and educational programs with the IAEA or other technology holders, but a base 
foundation in engineering and the sciences from an indigenous education system must be 
present. 
1. Burma 
Burma currently lacks the technical capacity to pursue a nuclear program.  The 
IAEA feasibility inspection conducted in 2001 upon Burma’s expressed interest in a 
research reactor indicated that Burma had a poor technological base and a collapsed 
education system.  It has insufficient technical capacity, and presently lacks the means to 
indigenously develop one.  To compound this issue, the IAEA has ignored any Burmese 
request for assistance in pursuing a research reactor based on these finding and other 
political reasons involving human right.126 
Burma’s lack of technical capacity and the avenue for acquiring it is being 
remedied by the wealth of the Burmese elite and assistance from Russia.  Many Burmese 
scientists and engineers are educated outside of Burma in western countries, mitigating 
the problem of its collapsed education system.  This means that Burmese scientists and 
engineers for the most part come from the Burmese elite who have enough money to send 
them to school.  As part of the deal with Moscow, 300 to 350 Burmese specialists are to 
be trained by Russia to operate the research reactor.  Numerous reports of large numbers 
of Burmese receiving nuclear training in Russia surfaced in 2002 and 2003.  It is not 
unexpected that a Russian-Burma deal of this magnitude would include nuclear training 
for Burmese scientists and technicians.  Lintner claims that 350 Burmese nationals 
(mostly military) had undergone nuclear training in Russia as part of the initial deal with 
Rosatom and several hundreds more have since been trained by the Russians. 127  With 
 
126 Selth, 6. 
127 Selth, 9; Gunn; Lintner. 
 60
                                                
the assistance of Russia, Burma is rapidly developing the technical capacity necessary to 
at least start a nuclear research program.  It does not yet possess sufficient levels of 
technical capacity to handle such a program without heavy assistance from the outside.  
Until Burma establishes an effective education system to transfer knowledge gained from 
Russia and the West to follow-on generations, it will not be able to sustain the technical 
capacity necessary to maintain a nuclear program without outside assistance. 
2. Malaysia 
Malaysia’s progression up the industrial production chain along with the work 
done by Nuclear Malaysia (Malaysia’s nuclear agency) in coordinating training with the 
IAEA has put Malaysia in a good position to quickly develop the necessary level of 
technical capacity to support a nuclear energy program.  Malaysia is branching out into 
the value-added and high tech industries. 
Malaysia has a Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI), which 
has taken the lead on enhancing science, technology and innovation (STI) for the 
purposes of supporting economic growth.  The technical nature of Malaysia’s growing 
industries needs scientists, engineers and technical administrators to function.  A 
secondary objective of MOSTI is to cultivate technical capacity for nuclear energy in 
Malaysia.  It has reorganized a sub-agency responsible for nuclear technology research 
and now calls it Nuclear Malaysia.  The objective of Nuclear Malaysia is to promote 
nuclear technology for industry and for energy production.128  It is from the pool of 
scientists, engineers, and technical administrators developed by MOSTI and Nuclear 
Malaysia for Malaysian industry that a nuclear energy program will draw its talent.  As 
more scientists, engineers and technical administrators are produced for the job market, 
more will also be available for the nuclear energy field as well.  Nuclear Malaysia is also 
conducting training courses and workshops for its personnel on numerous technical 
subjects necessary for a nuclear energy program as indicated in its 2006 annual report.129  
It is logical to speculate that this training program continued to the present. 
 
128 MOSTI, Malaysian Nuclear Agency 2006 Annual Report, 3-12. 
129 Ibid., 13-22. 
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Malaysia has sought IAEA technical assistance in building its technical capacity 
for nuclear energy.  Malaysia has completed or is involved in 94 Technical Cooperation 
(TC) projects with the IAEA.  Forty-two of the 94 projects are applicable to nuclear 
energy.  Of the eight TC projects active today, five projects are directly applicable to 
nuclear energy development.  In Southeast Asia, only Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand have more TC projects with the IAEA.130  Malaysia may have sufficient 
technical capacity for a nuclear energy program or is very close to developing it 
indigenously.  Since it has less urgency for developing nuclear energy because of its 
policies on fuel conservation and its reserves, it has the luxury of time to develop this 
capacity in a sustainable manner and to court public opinion in favor of it. 
3. Philippines 
The Philippines has been involved in the nuclear energy game since the 1970s.  
As previously discussed, PNRI has roots going back to the PAEC started in 1958 in 
concert with the U.S. Atoms for Peace program.  The mission of PNRI is to promote and 
regulate the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology.  For the most part, 
PNRI has been doing just that.  The PNRI has been working with agriculture and industry 
to improve production with the assistance of nuclear science and technology.  The PNRI 
has also coordinated education opportunities to a wide audience, ranging from industry to 
high school and college students. 131  The PNRI has been promoting the safe and 
peaceful application of nuclear technology effectively in the Philippines and proven that 
it is a competent technical organization.  If the Philippines were to pursue nuclear energy, 
it is likely that PNRI will lead the w
The Philippines has also participated in the IAEA TC program.  In Southeast Asia 
the Philippines is second only to Indonesia in the number of IAEA TC projects active or 
completed.  It also has the second largest number of TC projects applicable to nuclear 
energy development active or completed in the region.  Close coordination with the 
 
130 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) database, http://www-TC project.iaea.org/TC 
projectweb/default.asp (object name Department of Technical Cooperation; accessed July 25, 2008). 
131 Philippines Nuclear Research Institute, PNRI Annual Report 2007, 2007, 3-23, 
http://www.pnri.dost.gov.ph/pnri.php?pnri=publications (accessed April 1, 2009). 
 62
                                                
IAEA in assessment of the BNPP has also built experience in the Philippines technical 
community in working with nuclear energy issues.  The focus of the majority of TC 
projects conducted have been relate to the BNPP issue in some way or another.132  
Although, the PNRI has not focused on nuclear energy development in its projects with 
the IAEA TC program, it did build human capital in related fields.  Under this 
circumstance, the Philippines does not have sufficient technical capacity for nuclear 
energy development, but it can rapidly transition its present technical capabilities in that 
direction if nuclear energy becomes publically acceptable. 
G. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. 
Unlike in the countries discussed in Chapter II that had decided against pursuing 
nuclear energy, international support played a significant role in the nuclear decision for 
the countries in this chapter.  Support provided by the international community (as 
represented by the IAEA) and/or technology holders is a fundamental ingredient to 
developing a nuclear energy program in Burma, Malaysia and the Philippines.  
Technology holders include the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, France and 
Russia.  For the IAEA, the determinant of whether international support is provided 
hinges on three issues.  These three issues are nuclear weapon proliferation, the 
electricity needs of the country and nuclear safety and security.  These three issues 
directly or indirectly impact regional stability. 
For technology holders, the decision to provide assistance hinges on their national 
interests.  If the national objective is regional stability, technology holders may fall back 
on proliferation, electricity needs and nuclear safety and security as reasons to provide or 
withhold assistance.  On the other hand, individual national interest of a technology 
holder may motivate it to provide assistance to one of these countries regardless of 
international community approval.  The latter is the case with Burma.  The countries in 
this chapter can be split into two categories when it comes to international support.  The 
first is Burma where the international community as represented by the IAEA is very 
reluctant to assist in its nuclear research program, and a technology holder (Russia) is 
 
132 IAEA database, Department of Technical Cooperation. 
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providing assistance because it is in its national interest to do so.  The second category 
includes Malaysia and the Philippines.  These countries have not committed to nuclear 
energy development at present, but international support is readily available or has been 
provided in the past. 
1. Burma 
Burma has developed a poor reputation with the international community over the 
years.  When Burma attempted to gain IAEA support for a research reactor in 2001, it 
was met with skepticism and contempt.  Next, Burma turned to Russia, one of its largest 
trading partners, who agreed to assist Burma with its aspirations for a research reactor.  
Together both sides came to a deal that Russia would provide a research reactor and 
nuclear training for Burmese scientist and specialists in exchange for payment in money 
and primary goods.133  Through this deal, Burma received technology and material 
support for its nuclear research program. 
Why is Russia helping Burma with a research reactor?  Russian national interests 
in Southeast Asia include access to resources and markets, and increase in Russian 
influence in regional affairs.  These interests are best served by this course of action.  
Burma is rich in natural resources.  Russia is already a large trading partner with Burma, 
because it is one of the few countries that will trade with it.  By entering this agreement, 
Russia increases its influence over Burma and gaining a level of dependence from it.  
Burma is a member of ASEAN and this may be Russia’s way of worming its influence 
into the Southeast Asian region, an area where Russian influence has been waning since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of China and liberal market reforms.  Burma 
also sits along the shipping lanes between Europe and Asia.  To have a Russian friendly 
port along this trade route would benefit Russian national interest.  Again increasing 
Russian influence in Burma helps solidify this interest. 
Can Burma earn the approval of the international community for its research 
reactor?  Burma does not need nuclear energy as determined by the sections on electricity 
 
133 Selth, 6. 
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demand and available alternatives.  The international community also doubts that Burma 
can safely run such a program based on its technical capability shortfalls in the area of 
sustainment.  At the heart of this question is the issue of whether Burma is doing this for 
peaceful applications or does it have intentions to weaponize this technology.  Burma has 
been a long-standing proponent of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.  Through 
its work in non-proliferation and disarmament, Burma has achieved significant 
international recognition in spite of its poor economic and human rights record, and was 
selected the Chairman of the UN First Committee in 2000.  Burma is a party to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the additional protocols of the IAEA.  It is 
also a signature to the Bangkok Treaty establishing a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-
Free Zone.  Burma has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but 
has not ratified it.134  But the authoritarian and opaque nature of this regime leads many 
to believe that Burma can abandon its traditional position on non-proliferation for what it 
perceives to be a security issue.  Burma’s growing isolation and ties to North Korea also 
casts doubt on Burma’s intentions of non-proliferation.135  As discussed in the political 
will section, the driver for Burma’s desire for a research reactor is unclear.  What is 
certain is that Burma’s interest in nuclear energy has drawn the attention and concern of 
many in the international community. 
Burma has a relatively strong level of support from Russia in the area of 
technology and materials.  It lacks international approval, mainly because of the lack in 
transparency behind its desire for nuclear technology.  This lack of transparency is made 
worse by the repressive and reclusive nature of its ruling regime and the relatively 
underdeveloped condition of the country as a whole. 
 
134 United Nations(UN), “Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements,” 
United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf 
(accessed April 3, 2009); International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Safeguards and Verification. 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html (accessed April 3, 2009); Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Bangkok, Thailand, 
1995, http://www.aseansec.org/ 2082.htm (accessed April 2, 2009); Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty Organization, Member States, Status of Signature and Ratification database, 
http://www.ctbto.org/member-states/?no_cache=1 (accessed April 1, 2009). 
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NonProliferation Review 13, no. 3 (2006), 607-610; Selth, 3, 11-22. 
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2. Malaysia and The Philippines 
These two countries have not committed to nuclear energy, yet international 
support for such an effort is readily available to them.  Both countries had demonstrated a 
need, albeit not an urgent need, for a large scale source of electricity such as nuclear 
energy.  Both had a long history of credible levels of commitment to non-proliferation.  
Both are parties to the NPT, the IAEA Additional Protocols, the CTBT and the Bangkok 
Treaty.136  Although both countries have potential security issues with nuclear-capable 
China over the Spratly Islands, the threat perception between them is low and not 
substantial enough to cause either Malaysia or the Philippines to consider developing 
nuclear weapon.  China realizes that it has more to lose by taking a confrontational 
posture with other Spratly claimants and has shifted to softer influences.  China has been 
pushing for bilateral cooperation with other Spratly claimants and has achieved some 
level of energy cooperation with the Philippines.137 
Even though not perfect democracies, both Malaysia and the Philippines are 
considered to be well established democracies in Southeast Asia.  Both have mature 
indigenous educational systems that support technological industries and demonstrate a 
certain level of technical capacity on which nuclear technology can build.  All these 
things contribute to gaining a sense of feasibility in the eyes of the international 
community for these two countries, and access to international support and assistance is 
readily available. 
Other sources of technical and material support available to Malaysia and the 
Philippines come from Japan and South Korea.  Both countries are looking to expand 
their respective nuclear industry beyond domestic markets.  Both Japan and South Korea 
realized that their domestic consumption of the nuclear industry is not sufficiently to 
sustain this industry without export.138  Toshiba of Japan now owns Westinghouse 
 
136 UN, “Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements;” IAEA, “Safeguards 
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Electric Company LLC, the company that was contracted to build the BNPP in the 
Philippines as well as numerous nuclear power plants in the United States.139  Both may 
look to Malaysia and the Philippines as a future market.  Since both countries have a high 
level of international legitimacy for pursuing nuclear energy, they make ideal customers 
unlike Burma. 
Until recently, Malaysia has not seriously reached out to anyone for assistance in 
nuclear energy development.  Ironically, in 2007 the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. 
Mohamed ElBaradei, had offered Malaysia assistance in nuclear energy development as a 
means to relieve Malaysia’s near term energy pressures.140  In October 2008, Malaysia’s 
representative to the 52nd General Conference of the IAEA expressed Malaysia’s desire to 
include nuclear power development in future TC projects in order to prepare for a 
possible implementation of a nuclear power program.141 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Philippines had received full U.S. assistance 
through the Westinghouse Corporation for its nuclear energy program.  If the Philippines 
were to reverse its position on the use of nuclear energy, assistance from the United 
States may be just as forthcoming.  The Philippines is a U.S. treaty ally.  This current 
relationship is focused on balancing against Chinese influence in the region, and fighting 
terrorism and insurgency in the Southern Philippines.  This commitment makes stability 
and growth in the Philippines a U.S. concern.  This makes the United States again a 
possible source of technology and materials to a Filipino nuclear power program. 
 
139 “Toshiba Completes Westinghouse Acquisition.”  Westhinghouse press release, October 2004.  
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=no&TICK=WE&STORY=/www/story/10-
17-2006/0004453746&EDATE (accesses April 22, 2009). 
140 Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, “Nuclear Power: Looking to the Future,” Statement 
of the Director General at Nobel Laureate Public Lecture, Kuala Lumpur, July 2007, 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2007/ebsp2007n011.html (accessed April 3, 2009). 
141 Daud Mohamad, “Statement by Dr. Daud Mohamad, Director General, Malaysian Nuclear 
Agency, Head of Delegation of Malaysia to the 52nd Regular Session of the General Conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),” Vienna, October 2008, 3. 
 67
H. CONCLUSION: EACH COUNTRY’S DECISION 
The countries in this chapter fall into a category between those that have 
abstained from nuclear energy use and those that are actively pursuing it.  This in-
between status is a catch-all; countries fall into this category for different reasons.  Burma 
is looking to acquire nuclear technology by way of a research reactor project with 
assistance from Russia.  Malaysia is coming to terms with the realities of its energy 
pressures and is making a national course-steer towards nuclear energy.  The Philippines 
is recovering from a bad experience with nuclear energy and remains reluctant to 
reconsider this fuel source to relieve its growing energy pressures.  Each country in this 
chapter faces a unique situation. 
1. Burma 
The driver for Burma’s pursuit of nuclear technology is not a need for power 
generation.  In any case, it is not certain what objective has solidified Burma’s political 
will behind a nuclear research program.  Speculations on this objective range from 
national prestige to the possibility of weaponization.  The extreme alarmist views are 
unsubstantiated by Burma’s past actions and continued membership in numerous 
nonproliferation entities.  With its new-found boon in energy export, it is possible that 
Burma’s true objective lies in the middle of the extremes in that it is looking to 
supplement its energy export industry with electricity generated from nuclear power.  The 
only thing that is clear is that political will and international support are the dominant 
factors in Burma’s decision to pursue nuclear energy.  Without the assistance it is 
receiving from Russia, Burma would have no way of establishing a nuclear research 
program.  Moscow’s assistance is at least more transparent than other potential 
technology holders such as North Korea, Iran and possibly the Khan network, and can 
stand up to IAEA scrutiny. 
2. Malaysia 
The Malaysian case is relatively easy to understand.  Malaysia has a growing need 
for electricity and this need is motivating the political will to explore nuclear energy.  The 
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interesting point about Malaysia is how that political will is directing the course of 
nuclear energy development.  Malaysia’s growing electricity demand and shrinking 
natural gas reserves combine to produce a relatively gradual timeline for Malaysia to 
develop nuclear energy.  The political will for Malaysia’s nuclear energy program resides 
in the government, who has contained the debate by not officially committing to nuclear 
energy use and only expressed an “emerging interest.”  At the same time it is using 
MOSTI and Nuclear Malaysia to develop the support base for nuclear energy by 
promoting nuclear technology and education and training.  One day the people of 
Malaysia are going to wake up to the condition where the need for a new large scale 
energy source is great and ground work for a nuclear power program is mature.  It will 
seem like a natural fit and Malaysia will officially adopt nuclear energy development.  
This makes political will the dominant factor in the Malaysian case with electricity 
demand and available alternatives as significant supporting factors. 
3. Philippines 
The weakness of political will is the central factor in the Philippines’ decision on 
nuclear energy.  Although the need as a function of electricity demand and available 
alternatives is present, it is not urgent because of the potential alternatives such as 
geothermal power and continued exploration of indigenous coal sources.  It is also 
overshadowed by the bad experience of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant contracted and 
constructed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The Philippine public is adamantly against 
the use of nuclear energy in the country even while facing growing energy pressure, 
while the political leadership is more pragmatic and has not closed the door on nuclear 
energy in the Philippines.  The Philippines does have an available alternative in 
geothermal energy but it appears to be only moderately interested in this option.   
4. Closing Summary: Countries of Contradictions 
Surprisingly, the means of production and technical capacity had relatively little 
impact because of various domestic factors or a work-around between technology holders 
and the countries in this chapter.  Burma and the Philippines behaved contrary to the 
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impact of electricity demand and availability of alternatives.  Burma had little need for 
nuclear development opted to pursue a nuclear research program with power generation 
potential in the future.  The Philippines had a greater need for nuclear development but 
chose to abstain because of a prior bad experience.  In Malaysia’s case the combination 
of electricity demand and available alternatives afforded less it with urgency for nuclear 
energy development, somewhere in between the Philippines and Burma.  Support from 
the IAEA was denied to the country seeking it and was readily available to the two 
countries that were less urgent about it or not interested in it at all. 
For the countries in this chapter, political will was consistently the dominant 
factors in their policies regarding nuclear energy.  This factor produced decisive effects 
both for and against nuclear power developments in Burma and the Philippines 
respectively.  In Malaysia, political will shapes the method by which the country will 
ease into nuclear power development.  This process may be critical to its long term 
success in Malaysia because it will not be rushed into doing it fast but can take its time 
and do it right. 
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IV. COUNTRIES THAT HAVE ELECTED TO PURSUE 
NUCLEAR ENERGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Several Southeast Asian countries are looking to develop nuclear power to 
augment their energy portfolio.  The advent of a successful nuclear energy program can 
provide some relief from the pressures of fossil fuel dependence.  Indonesia, Thailand 
and Vietnam plan to have a functioning nuclear power program by the 2016-2020 
timeframe.  Indonesia is slower because it is balancing domestic preferences for and 
against nuclear energy development.  However, Indonesia has a significant lead on the 
other countries with its five decades of sporadic work towards this goal.142  It plans to 
build a 2,000 MW nuclear plant by 2017.  Earmarks of $8 billion for the development of 
four nuclear power plants by 2025 have been planned in Indonesia’s budget to increase 
nuclear energy’s share in electricity production by an additional 6,000 MW beyond the 
initial 2017 numbers.143  Thailand is making the slowest progress because of the political 
turmoil since the 2006 coup.  It is planning a 2,000 MW power plant (2 x 1,000 MW 
reactors) for operation in 2020 and one more 2,000 MW power plant in 2021.144  With its 
present political situation, this goal may not be achievable per the timeline prescribed. 
Vietnam is the most aggressive pursuer of nuclear energy among the three.  The 
Vietnamese government has laid out an ambitious plan for future development of their 
electricity production capabilities.  Nuclear power, as expected, will be evaluated on a 
trial basis initially with plans for a 2,000 MW nuclear power plant by 2020.  Vietnam has 
named two sites for their nuclear power plants.  The Ninh Thuan nuclear power plant No 
1 will be in Phuoc Dinh Commune, Ninh Phuoc District and the Ninh Thuan plant No 2 
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will be in Vinh Hai Commune, Ninh Hai District.145  An expected increase in nuclear 
energy generation to 8,000 MW is planned by 2025.  With this avenue of energy portfolio 
diversification, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam are taking steps to see if nuclear energy 
is a long-term, large scale solution for their electricity needs.  It is unrealistic to expect 
that nuclear power will produce a significant share of their generation capacity in the near 
future.  However, this prospect may occur over several decades if nuclear energy proves 
successful.  Indonesia and Vietnam are more confident in the prospects of nuclear energy 
than Thailand, as indicated by their ambitious plans for four nuclear power plants in 
comparison to Thailand’s two.  The development of one or two nuclear power plants with 
capacities in the few thousand MW is still only a small fraction when the total increase in 
generation capacity is expected to be in the 100 GW range in the next two decades.  If 
nuclear energy proves to be a successful source of electricity, as it has for countries like 
France, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, these Southeast Asian countries may try to make 
it a significant share of the total electricity generation capacity. 
B. ELECTRICITY DEMAND 
Electricity demand is inextricably linked to development, and assessing that 
demand is the first step toward gauging the need for nuclear energy.  The demand for 
electricity in Indonesia and Thailand is similar in the sense that both countries have a 
large demand driven by development, and that it is expected to grow significantly in the 
next two decades.  Vietnam presents a slightly different electricity demand scenario with 
a smaller initial demand, but with the potential to grow as large as the other two as a 
result of more rapid rates of economic growth. 
1. Indonesia and Thailand: Two Growing Peas in a Pods 
Indonesia and Thailand’s electricity demand is driven by their respective 
economic development.  The high level of industry, manufacturing and commerce in 
these two countries produce large electricity demands.  Couple this with the resulting 
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levels of urbanization, increased income and improved standards of living, and it is plain 
to see why electricity demand in these two countries is so high.  In 2005, Indonesia had 
about 28 GW of installed generation capacity with an annual consumption of about 
127,000 GWh.146  By the end of 2007, Thailand had about 28.5 GW of installed 
generation capacity with an annual consumption of about 135,000 GWh.147  By 
comparison, in 2005, Malaysia had an installed capacity of about 20 GW and consumed 
72,700 GWh of electricity, and the Philippines had 15.5 GW of installed capacity and 
consumed 46,900 GWh.  Thus, Indonesia and Thailand consume nearly twice the amount 
electricity as Malaysia and three times that of the Philippines.  This level of consumption 
is still far below the levels of Japan and South Korea (1 million GWh and 343,000 GWh 
respectively), but is approaching it.148  These numbers represent current electricity 
demand and capacities.  In the face of growing demand, it is easy to see Indonesia and 
Thailand trying to follow suit. 
To promote further economic growth, industry and commerce in these two 
countries must expand.  This expansion will result in still greater levels of electricity 
consumption and increased urbanization.  Economic growth and development in these 
countries over the past decade already has improved living standards, and as a result 
more people in these countries now own electricity consuming appliances and luxury 
goods.  Because of these trends, the electricity demand in Indonesia is expected to triple 
in the next two decades with the fasted growth coming from the commercial sector 
followed by the residential sector.  The rate of urbanization is expected to increase from 
44% in 2002 to 95% by 2030.149  Prior to the 2006 coup and 2008 financial recession, 
Thailand’s electricity demand was expected to quadruple in the next two decades, driven 
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by the manufacturing and service sectors.150  It is difficult to gauge how much these two 
events will impact this prediction, but it is reasonable to expect significant growth in 
electricity demand in Thailand’s near future.  By expanding their viable large scale 
electricity production capacities, these countries will have sufficient electricity to power 
new office buildings, hospitals, public transportation systems, and many other byproducts 
of urbanization and development.  Nuclear energy can be that large scale capacity.  The 
high level of electricity demand and its expected growth makes the pursuit of nuclear 
energy a promising prospect for Indonesia and Thailand. 
2. Vietnam 
At present, Vietnam’s electricity demand is not extraordinary when compared to 
other countries in Southeast Asia.  It rivals the Philippines with 12 GW of installed 
production capacity and consumed a little more than 40,000 GWh of electricity in 
2004.151  What makes Vietnam special is that its projected electricity demand growth rate 
is 7.8%, the highest of any countries in the region.  Although it is presently a net exporter 
of energy, Vietnam is expected to become a net importer of energy by 2020.  The driver 
for this trend is Vietnam’s rapid industrialization and increased service sector growth.  
Industrial demand will become the number one driver for energy demand (fossil fuels and 
electricity) by 2020.152 
This rapid industrialization should be accompanied by labor migration from rural 
to urban areas.  But despite its monstrous growth rate, Vietnam has one of the lowest per 
capita energy consumption rates in the region.  The significance of this trend is that the 
populace has not yet reaped the full benefits of development and thus has not experienced 
a dramatic jump in electricity demand due to urbanization.  As economic development 
continues in Vietnam and the populace begins to improve their quality of life, the 
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urbanizing effects on electricity demand will become more apparent and demand will go 
up significantly.  Strong income growth will raise standards of living and require more 
electricity for lighting, appliances, and other urban necessities.  As the country gets 
richer, the government will increase the level of electrification to the rural areas and 
improve infrastructure in urban and developed areas.  This will give more people access 
to electricity and, again, contribute to raising consumption.153  Faced with this mounting 
challenge, Vietnam is looking to nuclear energy to diversify its energy portfolio and help 
meet anticipated growth in electricity demand.  If the program is successful, it can be 
expanded to produce a greater share of electricity in the future.  Vietnam is so confident 
of the viability of this energy source that they have made plans for four nuclear power 
plants without first seeing how one will perform. 
C. AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SUPPLIES 
Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam are not without natural resources for energy 
production.  However, each country has specific limitations on its resources, and these 
constraints encourage them to explore nuclear energy as an alternative.   
1. Indonesia 
At present, Indonesia is energy self-sufficient but this situation will not last much 
longer.  Indonesia is the world’s largest LNG exporter.  It has coal, oil and other energy 
resources as well, but all of Indonesia’s resources are very distant from the population 
centers on Java.  Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and the 
breadth of Indonesia is comparable to the North American continent.  Getting energy 
resources from their origins to the metro centers for consumption is part of the 
problem.154  This transportation process also takes energy, and adds to the final cost of 
producing energy for consumption.  This rise in cost makes nuclear energy more 
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competitive because the availability of these resources is limited by the great distance 
they must travel.  Although exploration has increased the estimated natural gas reserves 
in Indonesia, the majority of gas sources are located in places that require gas 
liquefaction.  This is an expensive process and drives the price of natural gas up.  Only a 
small fraction of Indonesia’s gas fields are near Java.  Furthermore, about 56.6% of 
Indonesia’s annual gas production is exported; only the remainder is used for domestic 
consumption.155   
Coal is a resource that Indonesia also has in abundance and can be found in 
Kalimantan and Sumatra.  Indonesia is looking to increase the share of coal in electricity 
generation in order to conserve its gas resources and make up for its declining oil 
reserves.  Of the expanding generation capacity expected in Indonesia up to 2030, coal 
power is expected to account for 54% of this new capacity.  By 2030, coal will generate 
49% of Indonesia’s electricity.  Natural gas’s share is expected to rise from about 30% to 
39%.  The electricity sector is already the number one consumer of natural gas in the 
nation.  In the 1990s, Indonesia began looking to natural gas to offset the country’s 
declining oil production.  Now it is looking to coal to absorb the rest in order to manage 
its natural gas reserves.  Indonesia is expected to be a net energy imported by 2030 and it 
is looking to Malaysia for its future energy needs.156 
By looking to nuclear energy now, Indonesia is hedging for its future.  To wait 
until 2030 to explore this alternative would be too late and poor state planning.  If nuclear 
energy proves to be a successful avenue of energy portfolio diversification, Indonesia can 
give nuclear energy a larger share of electricity generation specifically in its densely 
populated areas on Java.157  As stated earlier, it already has plans for four nuclear power 
plants in the works.  Pipelines and liquefaction processes for natural gas are expensive.  
Transporting coal to metro centers burns oil.  Plus the longevity of these two resources 
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cannot compare to nuclear energy.  What nuclear energy brings to the table for Indonesia 
is a reduction in electricity costs to its major population centers on Java by mitigating the 
transportation costs of coal and gas. As electricity demand for these major areas goes up, 
a nearby nuclear plant will prove to be a better option than bringing coal and gas in from 
distant locations.  This option also reduces Indonesia’s electricity dependence on fossil 
fuels, and frees up more coal and natural gas for export. 
2. Thailand 
Unlike Indonesia, Thailand does not have a wealth of indigenous energy resources 
to meet its large demand for electricity.  It is expecting to see vast increases in demand 
over the next two decades.  Thailand’s peak electricity demand is expected to increase to 
56 GW by 2021.  At present Thailand’s predominant source of electricity is natural gas 
imported from Burma, Indonesia and Malaysia.  In fact, natural gas accounts for 80% of 
Thailand’s electricity production.  In order to reduce dependence on imported natural gas, 
Thai governments have begun to examine the possibility of expanding electricity 
generation capacity using coal, ,but domestic coal lacks the caloric value necessary for 
electricity production.  So, again this means relying on imports and does not break the 
dependence on imported energy.  The advantage that coal offers is that it is cheaper than 
natural gas.  However, since public views on coal fired plants are negative because of the 
health and environmental implications, augmenting the energy portfolio with coal has 
faced stiff opposition.158 
Thailand is also buying hydro-electricity power from neighboring Laos.  
Contracts for future hydro-electricity purchases from Burma and China have already been 
negotiated and signed.  The general trend of Thailand’s available alternatives to nuclear 
energy is through purchasing agreements and memorandums of understanding (MOU) 
with its resource rich neighbors.159  This makes Thailand’s energy security position very 
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weak and dependent on others.  The lack of indigenous energy resources when compared 
to consumption rates is good reason for Thailand to look to nuclear energy for future 
electricity needs.  Nuclear energy may be Thailand’s ticket away from its dependence on 
imported energy.  Like Indonesia, nuclear power will undergo a trial period and will only 
be a small fraction of Thailand’s near-term energy growth.   
3. Vietnam 
Vietnam has alternatives to nuclear energy for electricity production, but the 
reliability of its primary alternative is less than consistent.  In the 1990s, Vietnam 
generated 62% of its electricity from hydro-electric sources in the north.  Oil and gas 
made up 20% and coal made up 17% of the remaining capacity.  Vietnam’s installed 
generation capacity was greater than its consumption, when all sources were available.  
However, hydro-power in North Vietnam proved unreliable because of seasonal effects 
and droughts.  As a result, Vietnam had to import hydro-electric power from Laos, 
Cambodia and China to augment its domestic supply of electricity.  To address this issue, 
Vietnam has been increasing the share of coal and natural gas in its generation portfolio.  
Today, Vietnam’s electricity generation shares by fuel type is 46% natural gas, 26% coal, 
about 15% hydropower and 11% oil.160 
Vietnam’s exploration efforts since the 1990s have uncovered vast amounts of 
natural gas and coal.  This find supports Vietnam’s energy move to reduce its share of 
hydropower with shares of natural gas and coal power.  Exploration efforts have been so 
fruitful that Vietnam has become an exporter of energy and receive a healthy revenue 
stream from this industry.  With these new-found sources of energy, does Vietnam still 
have a need for nuclear energy?  Looking at available alternatives alone and the answer 
might be no.  But when combined with the anticipated electricity demand in Vietnam’s 
near future, it is clear that a significant need still exists.  Even with these indigenous 
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sources of energy, Vietnam is still expected to become a net importer of energy by 2020 
because of its monstrous growth rate.  Recognizing this challenge, Hanoi plans to bring 
48 GW of generation capacity on line between 2006 and 2015 (2,000 MW of which will 
be from nuclear power).  That is more than double the 2005 capacity of 12 GW.  An 
additional 120 GW of generation capacity is planned for 2025, 6,000 MW of which will 
be by nuclear power.161  Simply put, Vietnam does not believe that its bountiful, 
indigenous energy sources will be enough for the coming electricity demand, and it 
would be correct. 
D. POLITICAL WILL 
By committing to nuclear energy development, these three countries have 
demonstrated that they have the political will to pursue nuclear energy.  So this section 
will examine the political reason behind that decision and any domestic opposition that 
can diminish the political will to pursue nuclear energy.  These three countries include a 
democratic government, an authoritarian government, and a government in turmoil.  This 
sample will provide a wide range of variation on how different types of governments 
approach nuclear energy. 
1. Indonesia 
Indonesia has been pursuing nuclear energy off and on since the 1950s.  Looking 
at the combination of future electricity demand and the increasing costs of available 
alternatives, the need for nuclear energy development in Indonesia is more apparent than 
ever.  But this justification is not enough for some Indonesians who feel the associated 
risks of nuclear energy outweigh the benefits, and they have a voice.  Present day 
Indonesia is a democracy with relatively open media and press.  Free elections in October 
2004 installed the current Yudhoyono administration.  These trends make Indonesia one 
of the most democratic countries in Southeast Asia.  This democratic character has 
emboldened societal actors to participate in shaping Indonesia’s energy policy through 
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intermediate associations.  The intermediate associations in Indonesia for both sides have 
been publically debating the issues on nuclear safety openly and fiercely.162   
In Indonesia, both preferences for and against nuclear energy development have 
powerful intermediate associations representing their interests to the central government.  
Indonesia has a long standing, civilian-controlled National Atomic Energy Agency 
(BATAN).  This agency has deep roots in peaceful application and development of 
radioisotope and nuclear technology.  It has survived multiple regime changes and has 
always been seen as a nationalist civilian institution that is outside of politics.163  
BATAN is the intermediate association that represents the preference for nuclear power 
in Indonesia.  It is trying to raise the level of awareness and distribute updated 
information on nuclear power safety to the general public to address their safety 
concerns.  Modern nuclear plants are safer and more reliable than those in previous 
decades.  BATAN will look to Japan and South Korea as examples of how safe nuclear 
energy can be, especially the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant.  Here a Japanese 
nuclear plant withstood an earthquake beyond its seismic rating with no significant 
damage.  The IAEA reported that the plant was safe for operations in 2009.164  Its ability 
to sway public acceptance of nuclear energy will be critical if Indonesia is to proceed 
with nuclear en
The main forces opposing nuclear energy in Indonesia are represented by a 
coalition between the Islamic religious group Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Friends of 
Earth Indonesia (WALHI).  This opposition to nuclear energy in Indonesia has two major 
concerns.  The first concern is the designated location for the first nuclear plant near Mt. 
Muria, a dormant volcano.  The second concern is that the Indonesian government lacks 
the capability to safely operate a nuclear plant without significant, negative 
environmental impacts.  The NU is one of the most powerful religious groups in 
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Indonesia and many of the locals near Mt. Muria are members of this group.  The NU 
have declared the nuclear power plant site at Mt. Muria to be “haram” or forbidden.165  
NU’s opposition against nuclear power stems mainly from the potential dangers of a 
nuclear power plant near this dormant volcano and what that means for its followers 
nearby.  Although Indonesia is non-secular, it is the world’s largest Islamic country by 
population.  Its government is greatly influenced by religious groups. 
WALHI’s concern is focused on environmental conservation.  It feels that an 
Indonesian nuclear power plant will have significant environmental impacts which will 
adversely affect the ecology.  Many Indonesian economic sectors such as fishery and 
agriculture are ecologically dependent.166  Adverse ecological impacts mean adverse 
financial conditions for these sectors.  One hotly debated example of the safety issue is 
Indonesia’s poor public infrastructure safety record as evident by the 2006 official 
statistics on air and rail transportation crashes and accidents.  Indonesians fear that their 
government will have the same track record in nuclear power.167  Add to this the 
numerous natural disasters to which Indonesia is prone and safety becomes a very hot 
issue.  The average Indonesian is also concerned about the government’s ability to keep 
nuclear power plants safe from inept operators and natural disasters.  The anticipated site 
of Indonesia’s first nuclear power plant is less than ideal in the eyes of the people.  The 
majority of the country is in an earthquake zone because most of Indonesia is on the edge 
of the “Ring of Fire.”  This site is located near a dormant volcano, and in an earthquake 
zone.168  The second safety debate is centered on security of nuclear facilities against 
Indonesia’s security realities.  Indonesia is a transit point for transnational terrorist, and 
Indonesia’s internal security issues involving separatists are not completely put to bed.  A 
nuclear facility may prove to be a vulnerable and juicy target.  These security issues 
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further enflame the safety debate.  This open debate gives leverage to those opposing 
nuclear energy, and democracy gives the political room for them to use this leverage.  
Although WALHI and NU offer a lot of opposition, they do not offer any realistic 
solutions to the energy pressures.  This is a significant weakness in their position. 
This splits the preferences on nuclear energy in Indonesia.  Jakarta referees 
between these two competing preferences and currently favors nuclear energy 
development because of the emerging energy demand pressures.  Some Indonesians are 
for it and others, including the locals around Mt. Muria, are against it.169  The democratic 
nature of Indonesia allows both sides to voice their views and does not disenfranchise one 
group or another.  In the developing world, environmental concerns are often trumped by 
need.  It is unlikely that Indonesia will turn away from nuclear energy under pressures 
from WALHI and NU in the face of mounting electricity demand.  Instead, Indonesia will 
continue its cautious progress towards nuclear energy development.  It will use the time 
afforded by this cautious advance to promote nuclear energy and build confidence in its 
public. 
2. Thailand 
Thailand shows no indication of having the same cleavage among its urbanites as 
in Indonesia.  The general trend in Thailand is that the societal actors care more about the 
current political turmoil than the debate on nuclear energy.  Both sides of the political 
conflict recognize the necessity of nuclear energy in light of Thailand’s expanding 
electricity demand and lack of available resources.  This is evident by Thailand’s 
consistent stance on nuclear energy throughout the various governments in power since 
before the 2006 coup to today.170  The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) asserts that nuclear energy is necessary because of future shortfalls of natural 
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gas expected in the next three to four years.171  The societal preference in Thailand for 
nuclear energy appears to be unopposed for now.  Once the political smoke clears, and 
the debate on nuclear energy enters the public domain, this may change.  It is expected 
that the “Yes I’d like to have nuclear energy, but not in my backyard,” syndrome will 
take root in Thailand once the location of the first nuclear power plant is announced. 
Thailand’s intermediate associations are in flux since the conflict between the 
Royalists and the Thaksinites have yet to play out.  The battles between these two 
factions have overshadowed the nuclear energy issue.  There is a lack of high level debate 
and both sides have not developed a dedicated position on the issue beyond a general 
sense of support.  The preference for nuclear energy in Thailand is represented by the 
EGAT, a bureaucratic entity that is apolitical and continues to march along its planned 
path to nuclear energy development.  The ASEAN Plus Three meetings hosted by 
Bangkok in the summer of 2008 discussed the issues of nuclear power and alternative 
energy sources extensively.  This indicates that the Thai government is still making 
headway on their nuclear plan as guided by EGAT, despite the ongoing political turmoil.  
EGAT issued a Power Development Plan in January 2008 with a timetable for both 
nuclear power plant projects (EGAT # 1-2, and EGAT # 3-4).172  As other intermediate 
associations are in turmoil, EGAT will pursue its plan to the extent possible under the 
current political situation while receiving little political oversight and assistance.  This 
explains why Thailand is crawling towards nuclear energy at a snail’s pace.  The benefit 
to this slow crawl is that continual progress will build momentum over time unnoticed 
and unchecked by opposing intermediate associations.  If and when Thailand emerges 
from its political crisis, this momentum may be too great to steer away from nuclear 
energy development. 
3. Vietnam 
Vietnam, like Thailand, shows no indications of having a cleavage among societal 
actors on the nuclear energy issue.  Initial thinking may attribute this to the control of an 
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authoritarian regime over its populace,173 but the Vietnamese people have just as much to 
gain from nuclear power if not more than their energy-hungry neighbors in Thailand and 
Indonesia.  Vietnam’s rate of economic growth has been staggering, and the development 
of more electricity generating capacity will only perpetuate this trend.174  This 
phenomenon may give more credence to preference for nuclear energy if open debates 
were allowed.  Demonstrating an ability to achieve this technological feat would be a 
bright feather in its cap.  Foreign investors may also see this as developmental progress in 
the right direction and become even more eager to do business in Vietnam, again 
contributing to Vietnam’s economic growth.  Although this is speculation, it is not 
outside the realm of possibility under the current situation.  At present the only societal 
actors in Vietnam that matter are those tied to Vietnam’s ruling regime (the communist 
party) and they have clearly expressed their preference in favor of nuclear energy 
development. 
Vietnam, as an authoritarian communist country, has only one intermediate 
association in nuclear power development.  The Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission 
(VAEC) is the representative of the preference for nuclear power in Vietnam.  The 
VAEC falls under the Ministry of Science and Technology branch of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party (VCP).175  No open source data was found on the VAEC that did not 
originate from the state.  Vietnam’s intermediate association in favor of nuclear energy 
(the VAEC) will remain completely supported and unopposed as long as the VCP 
remains in power.  This factor is consistent with the speed at which Vietnam is barreling 
towards nuclear energy. 
E. ADEQUATE MEANS OF PRODUCTION TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR 
POWER 
All three countries in this chapter have sufficient means of production to develop 
nuclear power.  In the area of capital, Indonesia and Thailand are strong economies in the 
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region.  Indonesia has earmarked $8 billion for the four nuclear plants it plans to 
construct by 2025.  Indonesia exports a large amount of energy resources (oil, coal and 
natural gas) and earns significant revenue from it.  Thus, it is not difficult to see why it 
has sufficient capital.  Indonesia’s economy under the Yudhoyono presidency has done 
well with robust economic growth and solid fiscal stewardship.  The 2009 global 
recession will stunt the economy’s upward trend to some extent, but not seriously enough 
to deter Indonesia from its nuclear power path.176 
Thailand’s political turmoil has crossed over into the economic sphere and eroded 
investor confidence.  Even the tourism industry, one of Thailand main staples, has been 
crippled by recent events.177  The global recession will dampen economic recovery even 
more and may delay budgeting allocations for plant construction.  But all the while 
EGAT is moving along with its nuclear energy plans without much notice.  It is still in 
the preparatory phase of development and has not yet reached the point for funding 
allocations toward construction.  The key point to keep in mind is that the Thai economy 
was one of the strongest in Southeast Asia prior to the 2006 political crisis and the 2008 
global recession, so the starting point for this economic decline has some cushion.  If the 
politics of Thailand can be resolved, economic improvements, if not recovery, should be 
quick to follow.  Even with events as they are, Thailand still reported GDP in the range of 
$500 billion during 2006, 2007 and 2008 with a slight upward trend.178  At present, 
Thailand is facing economic difficulties which may result in delaying capital for its 
pursuit of nuclear energy, but capital will not be the limiting factor in the long run. 
The Vietnamese economy is another Southeast Asian success story.  It has been 
one of Asia’s fastest growing economies since 2001 with exports to the United States 
increasing by 900% from 2001 to 2007.  The poverty level in Vietnam has declined to 
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less than that of China, India and the Philippines.179  The booming economy of Vietnam 
may face some challenges during the global recession started in late 2008, but Vietnam’s 
commitment to nuclear energy will see that adequate capital is mustered and allocated to 
this project.  It is of prime importance to future growth and the Vietnamese see this as an 
investment in that future growth. 
An adequate labor force to support nuclear power exists in Indonesia and 
Thailand because these two countries are industrialized.  Both have industries ranging 
from high-tech to light, and have large scale thermal energy based industries.  This means 
that both have a trained and developed labor pool suited for construction of a nuclear 
power plant.  It is from this industrial labor pool that the workforce for constructing a 
nuclear plant will be drawn.  The labor force in Vietnam is a little more questionable.  
With a rapidly developing industrial base, has the Vietnamese workforce developed in 
parallel?  In 2000, the technical labor force in Vietnam was assessed as not being of 
optimal ratio for the needs of a developing country.  The ratio of three levels of technical 
workers from high to low broke out to 1:1.2:1.8.  This indicates that there was a shortage 
of workers in the middle and lower technical level.  These levels are the welders, 
mechanics, plumbers and foremen necessary in building a power plant.180  But the key 
point is that those skilled technical workers exist in Vietnam.  With its ability to direct 
resources and manpower, Hanoi should be able to muster sufficient technical labor to 
pursue a nuclear program.  Since the 2000 study, the technical workforce in Vietnam is 
only expected to get better and larger because of the economic growth it experienced. 
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F. TECHNICAL CAPACITY 
Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam have had a hand in nuclear technology since the 
1960s with roots going back to the Atoms for Peace program.181  Each country has a 
government agency that has been operating a research reactor for peaceful purposes for 
years.  Each country has sufficient technical capacity for nuclear energy development, but 
each also faces specific challenges unique to its domestic environment. 
Indonesia’s BATAN has been involved in nuclear technology for about five 
decades, and operates three research reactors with a fourth in the works.  It has worked 
extensively with the IAEA in the Technical Cooperation (TC) program.  It has completed 
124 TC projects and is active in 17 TC projects.  Of these 141 TC projects, 89 are 
applicable to nuclear energy development.  Indonesia has the highest number of TC 
projects with the IAEA in Southeast Asia and over 50% of them relate to nuclear 
power.182  A problem that BATAN is facing is the brain-drain associated with an aging 
work force.  To replenish the retiring experts and specialist, BATAN must recruit and 
train replacements.  But it has to also compete with other technical industries for these 
recruits, which hurts its gain numbers.  Once recruits have established a productive level 
of knowledge, BATAN has to fight to retain them against those same industries to keep 
its developing or developed talents.183  Although this is a challenge for BATAN 
throughout the career progression of its members, it is not anticipated that this obstacle 
will prevent it from successfully developing nuclear energy. 
Thailand is another country with heavy involvement in nuclear technology.  The 
Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (OAEP) was established in 1961 and changed its 
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name to the Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP) in 2003.184  It has worked with both the 
IAEA through the TC program and the United States through the Atoms for Peace 
program primarily focusing on agricultural and medical applications.  Recent energy 
pressures have shifted Thailand’s nuclear technology focus to energy production.  This 
means that Thailand is behind Indonesia in the pursuit nuclear energy, but its relationship 
with the IAEA is just as deep.  Thailand has completed 93 TC projects and has 13 TC 
projects active.  Of these 106 projects 46 are applicable to nuclear energy development.  
Of the 13 TC projects currently actively, only 4 do not have nuclear energy 
applicability.185  The political turmoil has left the OAP relatively untouched and allows it 
to go about its business unhindered.  The scientific and bureaucratic expertise in Thailand 
pertaining to nuclear energy development has slowly progressed since the 1960s.  Today 
sufficient technical capacity exists to develop nuclear energy even in the face of political 
turmoil. 
South Vietnam was part of the Atoms for Peace program started in the early 
1960s.  The Da Lat research reactor was built in 1963 by General Atomic based in San 
Diego and ran with U.S. assistance and fuel until the waning days of the Vietnam War.  
After Vietnamese reunification, the Vietnamese ran Da Lat with Soviet fuel and 
assistance.186  The Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC) has been around since 
1976 and IAEA records show cooperation with Vietnam going back to 1971.  Vietnam’s 
technical capacity has come a long way since the 1970s.  Like Thailand, Vietnam’s early 
nuclear technology focus was on agriculture and medical applications.  Since 
liberalization, energy has become a paramount concern for this developing country and 
interests in nuclear energy production grew.  Vietnam has completed 79 TC projects with 
the IAEA and has 16 active projects.  Of the 95 total projects, 51 have nuclear energy 
applicability and of the 16 active projects, half deal with nuclear energy.  An official 
from the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Power has expressed confidence in Vietnam 
preparation for nuclear power development and states that the IAEA stands ready to 
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assist.187  Vietnam is the most aggressive pursuer of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia 
and this aggression can be seen in the timeline for its first two power plants.  The pace at 
which these plants are to come online may outstrip the rate at which technical capacity in 
the form of human capital can be developed.  The Chairman of the VAEC, Tran Huu 
Phat, has highlighted human resource deficiencies that need to be overcome if Vietnam is 
to meet its timeline for its first two reactors.188  With undeterred state backing, Vietnam 
has amassed significant technical capacity to realistically pursue nuclear energy 
development but still face some human resource shortfalls that may delay development. 
G. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
Based on the threat perception in the region and the genuine need for nuclear 
power, these countries are not seen as proliferation threats and international support of 
their nuclear energy ambitions is forthcoming from the technology holders in the 
international community.  Indonesia and Thailand have a relatively benign security threat 
environment with other countries in the region and no sovereignty issues that can pull 
either country into total war with its neighbors.  Current Thai-Cambodian tensions over 
the sovereign claim of a temple have led to some security force clashes, but it is very 
unlikely that the two countries will commit to war over the issue.  Primary security issues 
of significance in Indonesia and Thailand are of a domestic nature involving insurgency 
and terrorism.189  Both cases lack the motive for nuclear proliferation based on security 
needs. 
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Vietnam’s case is a little more complex.  It has sovereignty disputes with nuclear 
capable China over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.  The reason behind these disputes is 
the potential fossil fuel resources in the South China Sea.  The last time these two 
countries fought, Vietnam had a battle-hardened military fresh from conflict with the 
U.S. military while China had a poorly trained antiquated force.  The result was 
decisively in favor of the Vietnamese.  Since then, China has modernized and 
professionalized its military while the Vietnamese military atrophied without Soviet 
support.  Nuclear weapons may be seen as an equalizer for Vietnam if it had to face 
China today.  But Vietnam has seen the benefits of cooperating with China to explore 
these resources through the actions of the Philippines.  It is more beneficial to share the 
resources if it means getting to them faster.  This prospect mitigates the chance of a war 
with a militarily superior China and instead pushes for cooperation.  Ironically, China is 
one of the country with which Vietnam has a nuclear cooperation agreement.  Vietnam 
has also abandoned ambitions of regional hegemony over Indochina and has pursued a 
more benign foreign policy towards its neighbors since 1991.  This situation greatly 
reduces Vietnam’s need for a nuclear weapon.190  Vietnam has also demonstrated a 
willingness to work with the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to secure 
weapons grade uranium.  The VAEC and GTRI worked together to remove weapons 
grade uranium fuel rods from the Da Lat research reactor and replaced it with low 
enriched uranium fuel rods.  The weapons grade material was sent back to Russia, the 
country of origin, for reprocessing into lower grade uranium fuel.191  This case further 
supports Vietnam’s intent on peaceful applications of nuclear technology. 
The compliance and promotion of nonproliferation norms by these three countries 
further engender the international support of their efforts.  All three countries are 
signatures to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), The Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, and the Bangkok Treaty establishing a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone (SEANWFZ).  All three countries have also agreed to the IAEA Safeguards and 
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Verification regime, and the IAEA Additional Protocol.192  These assurances provide the 
international community with confidence that Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam will not 
develop nuclear weapons and the electricity demands in all three countries underscore 
their genuine need for nuclear power. 
Now that it is plain why the international community would not be opposed to 
assisting these three countries, the reasons why support should be provided needs to be 
discussed.  Aside from the idea that economic development and growth in this region is 
generally good for Asia and the world, certain technology holders such as the United 
States, Russia, France, Japan and South Korea have developed a nuclear industry for 
export.  These countries do it because it is profitable, and because they are discovering 
that their domestic consumption of this industry is insufficient to keep the industry going 
and are looking to a foreign market to make up the difference.193  Indonesia has already 
contracted a feasibility study to a South Korean company in concert with PT Medco 
Energi International.194  Thailand’s EGAT is evaluating four international firms for the 
contract on its nuclear power plants.  The candidates so far are France, The United States 
and two Japanese companies.195  It is speculated that the political situation in Thailand 
has pushed this decision indefinitely to the right.  Vietnam is building numerous 
relationships with technology holders similar to Thailand and Indonesia.  They include 




192 United Nations, “Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements,” United 
Nations (UN), http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (accessed April 3, 2009); International Atomic 
Energy Agency, “Safeguards and Verification,” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html (accessed April 3, 2009); Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Bangkok, Thailand, 
1995, http://www.aseansec.org/2082.htm (accessed April 2, 2009); Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty Organization, Member States, Status of Signature and Ratification database, 
http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/ (accessed April 1, 2009). 
193 Gunn. 
194 Symon, “Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Power Thrust”, 126; Malley and Ogilvie-White, 7-8. 
195 Reuters, “Four Firms Eyes Thai Nuclear Power Plant Project,” Thomson Reuters, January 11, 
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssConsumerGoodsAnd RetailNews/idUSBKK31050420080111 
(accessed May 7, 2009). 
196 Hibbs, 17. 
 92
countries is readily available and forthcoming because of the potential profits involved, 
and the fear of proliferations has been greatly reduced by the actions and trends of these 
three countries. 
H. CONCLUSION: EACH COUNTRY’S ROAD TO NUCLEAR ENERGY. 
For Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam the most significant factors in their 
decisions to pursue nuclear energy development was their need, in other words a growing 
gap between growing electricity demand and the declining availability of non-nuclear 
alternatives.  Thailand had the greatest need in that it consumed about as much electricity 
as Indonesia without the energy resource wealth of Indonesia.  Also, the size of 
Thailand’s population is only a fraction of Indonesia’s population, meaning that per 
capita, Thailand consumes more electricity.  Vietnam had the smallest need in terms of 
electricity demand and available resources.  However, once these countries made the 
decision to pursue nuclear energy, other factors became paramount in affecting how each 
country approached this national objective.  As in chapter III, political will was a 
dominant factor that affected the pace at which each country marched towards nuclear 
power development.  But unlike the previous chapter, technical capacity was the other 
dominant factor and especially contributed to setting the pace of nuclear development in 
Vietnam. 
If these countries were categorized from most aggressive to least aggressive in 
their pursuit of nuclear energy, the lineup would be Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand 
respectively.  This order also corresponds to the level of political will each country has 
for nuclear energy development.  Vietnam is by far the most aggressive, jumping into this 
race as the least developed of the three countries.  The authoritarian nature of the 
Vietnamese government coupled with an overwhelming desire for continued economic 
growth provides tremendous motivation for its nuclear development program.  Limiting 
its rate of advance is its human capital margin in technical capacity.  Although Vietnam 
has sufficient technical capacity to develop nuclear energy, it has a small margin on the 
human resource component of that technical capacity which can limit how fast its two 
nuclear power plants can be completed.  Simply put, Vietnam needs more scientist and 
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engineers at this level.  Vietnam is already the fastest pursuer of nuclear energy and it 
would like to advance at an even faster pace if it could.  Greater investment in human 
resources can close this vulnerability in technical capacity. 
Indonesia is a well established democracy where opposition to official views is 
not treated with such a heavy hand.  Here interest groups opposed to nuclear power 
development are competing with the government for influence of the general public’s 
views on nuclear power.  The Indonesian government is proceeding very slowly and 
cautiously with its nuclear power program while trying to win over the public.  It must 
use BATAN to promote and disseminate information on the safety and reliability of 
nuclear power, and it must also overcome its own sorted reputation of poor public safety.  
It is an uphill battle for Indonesia to win public approval, but it is essential if nuclear 
power development is to be successful in Indonesia.  Without the general support of its 
people, Indonesia’s dream of nuclear power may be impossible to realize. 
Thailand is in political turmoil, but this situation is not necessarily an obstacle for 
EGAT and OAP in their pursuit of nuclear power.  All political attention is on the 
struggle between the Royalists and the Thaksinites.  Under these conditions, slow 
progress on nuclear power development remains possible.  No groups have voiced 
opposition, and the bureaucratic EGAT and OAP machines are progressing with their 
plans relatively unopposed.  The only stops along this path are those requiring major 
government decisions, like budgeting, site approvals and awarding of contracts.  Once 
EGAT and OAP reach any of these stops, they will have to either wait for the political 
situation to die down or attempt to slide the issue in for the approval of who every is in 
control of the government at the time.  By doing the latter, EGAT runs the risk of 
drawing negative attention to itself if that controlling government loses power to the 
opposition.  It is better to let things progress up to the stops and wait.  This slows the 
progress of nuclear development significantly and may push the timeline indefinitely to 
the right until the political infighting is over. 
Unlike Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam do not face immovable political 
obstacles to nuclear energy progress.  For where they are in their nuclear energy program 
development, the factor of technical capacity is the main obstacle that they must 
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overcome.  Indonesia has been working on building this technical capacity for decades 
while Vietnam has only been focused on this effort for the past decade.  Naturally, it is 
expected that Indonesia would have accrued sufficient technical capacity for developing 
nuclear energy while Vietnam may be a little short.  The rate at which Indonesia is 
moving towards nuclear energy (as determined by political will) coupled with their 
technical capacity is a combination where the Indonesians can make up for any gaps in 
human resource that may occur before they need it.  This cushion does not exist in 
Vietnam’s case because of the aggressive time table of their program. 
Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam are approaching nuclear energy development at 
different rates even though they face similar regional energy pressures.  At this stage of 
development, the reason for variation in rate of development stems from the dominant 
factors of political will and technical capacity.  Indonesia’s political will for nuclear 
energy has some domestic opposition, but its technical capacity is sufficient for nuclear 
energy development.  Vietnam has no opposition to its political will, but faces possible 
human resource problems that can dampen technical capacity.  Thailand lacks political 
will to proceed beyond any points planned prior to the political crisis started in 2006, and 
will stall out once the program reaches these pre-planned points.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR 
NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
A. THE PURPOSE BEHIND THIS THESIS 
This thesis evaluated the eleven Southeast Asian countries to ascertain the reasons 
why some have chosen to pursue nuclear power, while others have abstained.  And 
among those that have opted for nuclear energy, it has identified the reasons why some 
are pursuing that goal more quickly than the others.  The main reasons why nuclear 
energy development in Southeast Asia is significant are its potential contribution to 
sustaining economic growth, the safety concerns unique to this particular energy source, 
and the security concerns associated with nuclear material.  The impact of these three 
factors on the regional stability in Southeast Asia emphasizes the importance of gauging 
nuclear energy development in Southeast Asia. 
B. ANSWERING THE THESIS QUESTION 
In order to analyze why some Southeast Asian countries have chosen to pursue 
nuclear power while others have abstained, this thesis evaluated six potential causes in 
each country: electricity demand; the availability of alternatives to nuclear energy; 
political will; the means of production; technical capacity; and international support.  The 
hypothesis is that a country will pursue nuclear energy if it stands to gain more from the 
potential increase in electricity generation capacity than from other forms of large scale 
electricity sources when equal national effort is applied.  The eleven Southeast Asian 
countries can be categorized into three groups: countries that have abstained from nuclear 
energy; countries that may pursue nuclear energy in the near future but are not doing so at 
the present; and countries that are pursuing nuclear energy.  The categorization of each 
country is influenced mainly by just one or two of the six potential causes.  Among those 
that have opted for nuclear energy, the factor of political will was the key determinant of 
how quickly that country is moving toward nuclear energy. 
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1. Countries that have Abstained From Nuclear Energy 
This is the largest of the three categories pertaining to the decision on nuclear 
energy.  It consists of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore and Timor-Leste.  The general 
characteristics of the countries in this category fall under two types.  The first type is an 
underdeveloped country where an increase in electricity generation capacity in the 
thousands of megawatt range does little to improve the social or economic situation.  
Countries in this sub-category are Cambodia, Laos and Timor-Leste.  In these countries, 
the infrastructure for electricity distribution is so lacking that additional generation 
capacity would be almost pointless because the majority of the people would not have 
access to it.  The dominant factor in these countries is the low demand for electricity 
because of a lack of distribution infrastructure.  A close secondary factor contributing to 
their decision to abstain is the insufficient means of production (capital and skilled labor) 
to pursue a nuclear project because of its high initial cost of entry and its demand for 
skilled labor.  In addition, these three countries have an abundance of alternatives to 
nuclear energy for large scale electricity production.  This factor is the coup de grâce that 
ensures these three countries will not turn to nuclear energy in the near future. 
The second type of countries in this category is developed countries that have an 
overwhelming disposition against nuclear energy development.  The two countries in this 
sub-category are Brunei and Singapore.  The dominant factors keeping Brunei out of the 
nuclear energy game is its relatively small electricity demand in comparison with its 
enormous availability of fossil fuels (alternative to nuclear energy).  Brunei’s natural gas 
reserves are expected to satisfy its electricity consumption growth beyond the 2030 
timeframe.  Singapore is a different story.  Here, the dominant factor is a lack of political 
will.  Singapore has a high demand for electricity but because of its geographic 
limitations, it cannot satisfy the 30 km recommended safety standoff distance from 
nuclear power plants to urban centers.197  This limitation makes nuclear energy an 
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unsuitable solution to Singapore’s electricity demand problem.  Singapore will continue 
to be dependent on imported fossil fuel to meet its high electricity demand. 
Countries that have abstained from nuclear energy do so because of a dominant 
factor that makes nuclear energy an unsuitable solution to their energy needs.  Some 
countries have more than one factor that steer it away from nuclear energy while others 
(Singapore) have only one factor that greatly constrain it even though it has great need 
for energy. 
2. Countries that may Potentially Pursue Nuclear Energy in the Near 
Future 
There are countries in Southeast Asia that are sitting on the fence when it comes 
to nuclear energy.  These countries are lumped together as countries that may potentially 
pursue nuclear energy in the near future.  These countries include Burma, Malaysia and 
the Philippines.  Burma is included because it is in the process of acquiring a 10 MW 
research reactor and starting a fledgling nuclear technology program.198  If not for this 
milestone decision, Burma would be in the same category as Cambodia, Laos and Timor-
Leste.  The dominant factors in Burma’s case are political will and international support.  
The unique issue regarding Burma is the apparent lack of clear purpose behind its pursuit 
of nuclear technology.  Acquiring a 10 MW research reactor is not an earth shattering 
event for the region.  Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam already 
have research reactors.199  The concern is centered on such a reactor in the hands of an 
unpredictable, non-transparent military regime.  Burma has low electricity demand 
because of the lack of distribution infrastructure much like Cambodia, Laos and Timor-
Leste.  It has abundant alternatives to nuclear energy for electricity generation.  So the 
need for nuclear energy does not exist.  Speculation about the motives behind Burma’s 
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nuclear technology ambition is that it is doing it for prestige and trying to keep up with its 
neighbors.  Burma is receiving assistance with this 10 MW reactor from Russia’s 
Rosatom.  This international support is what makes Burma’s nuclear endeavor possible.  
Russia is assisting Burma for two reasons.  First it is looking to increase its influence in 
the region and second, it is doing it for profit.  It is even will to take payment from Burma 
in the form of primary goods such as agricultural products.200  
Malaysia and the Philippines are two countries that are considering nuclear 
energy.  Both countries have high electricity demand and both countries have alternatives 
to nuclear energy for electricity production.  However, the mismatch in demand and 
available energy sources is a gap that is widening.  The dominant factor with these two 
countries is political will.  Malaysia has maintained an official position that it does not 
intend to pursue nuclear energy, but numerous indicators in Malaysia including 
statements by officials in energy-related offices point to a transition towards pursuing 
nuclear energy.201  Political will is slowly building under the auspices of Nuclear 
Malaysia and the Malaysian government.  Malaysia intends to slowly cultivate support 
for nuclear energy given that it has a relatively low level of urgency thanks to its natural 
gas reserves.  In the Philippines, political will is working in the opposite direction.  Due 
to a bad experience with the construction of the Bataan nuclear power plant (BNPP) 
during the Marcos administration, the public is strongly opposed to nuclear energy 
development.  However, energy pressures have forced every Philippine administration to 
re-examine the issue since President Aquino established a policy against nuclear energy 
in the Philippines.  Until domestic opinion on nuclear energy changes, the Philippines 
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increasing cost of fossil fuel, both financially and environmentally.  This driver is 
significant and may one day shift domestic opinion in the Philippines towards nuclear 
energy. 
3. Countries That Are Pursuing Nuclear Energy 
For the countries that are pursing nuclear energy, the driving factors behind their 
decision to do so was electricity demand and lack of available alternatives to nuclear 
energy for large scale electricity production.  Indonesia and Thailand have high and 
increasing demand for electricity.  Vietnam has a relatively low electricity demand in 
comparison to the other two countries but faces the prospect of a rapidly growing demand 
that will close the gap in a short period of time.  All three have varying levels of available 
alternatives energy sources to nuclear power.202  But the bottom line is that it will be 
extremely difficult to meet the expected increase in electricity demand after 2030 with 
these sources alone and the level of dependence on fossil fuels would be tremendous.  
Thus, all three countries are looking to nuclear energy on a trial basis to see if it is a 
viable alternative for large scale electricity production and to reduce their dependence on 
increasingly expensive and depleting fossil fuels.203  The payoff for successfully 
expanding their electricity generation capacity to meet expected demands is sustained 
economic development.  The combination of these two factors and the resulting benefit 
represents a legitimate need for nuclear energy. 
The possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation as a result of this development is 
unlikely, but cannot be ignored.  All countries in Southeast Asia have demonstrated a 
 
202 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: 
Indonesia, Asia Pacific Energy Research Center (Tokyo, 2006), 33-36, http://www.ieej.or.jp/aperc/ 
outlook2006.html (accessed December 23, 2008); Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC 
Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: Thailand, Asia Pacific Energy Research Center (Tokyo, 2006), 
95-97, http://www.ieej.or.jp/aperc/ outlook2006.html (accessed December 23, 2008); Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2006: Vietnam, Asia Pacific 
Energy Research Center (Tokyo, 2006), 105-110, http://www.ieej.or.jp/aperc/ outlook2006.html (accessed 
December 23, 2008). 
203 Geoffrey Gunn, “Southeast Asia’s Looming Nuclear Power Industry,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: 
Japan Focus, posted on February 11, 2008, http://www.japanfocus.org/_Geoffrey_Gunn-
Southeast_Asia_s_Looming_Nuclear_Power_Industry (accessed January 15, 2009); Andrew Symon, 
"Southeast Asia's Nuclear Power Thrust: Putting ASEAN's Effectiveness to the Test", Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 30, no. 1 (2008): 119-120, http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed 31 Jul 2008). 
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trend towards the norm of non-proliferation through their actions.  They are all members 
of numerous international institutions that support non-proliferation and have even 
established their own nuclear weapons free zone.  The only scenario that would risk 
departure from this trend would require a significant shift in the security environment 
within the region.  This shift is unlikely since all parties thus far have reaped benefits 
from the stable security environment present in the region today.204  This answers the 
question of why they elected to pursue nuclear energy. 
As for answering the question of what determines how rapidly Indonesia, 
Thailand and Vietnam are pursuing nuclear energy, political will is the dominant factor.  
Vietnam has the most political will behind its program while Thailand has the least.  
Indonesia is in the middle.  This lineup also corresponds to the lineup of how 
aggressively each country is pursuing nuclear energy.  Although Vietnam is the late 
comer to the race, they have no expressed domestic opposition to nuclear energy 
development and the authoritarian government can direct significant efforts towards this 
endeavor.205  It is only limited by technical capacity in the form of available human 
resource constraints.  This poses a risk to the timeline of Vietnam’s first two reactors, but 
does not threaten its ultimate success.206 
Although the Indonesian government has a long history of pursuing nuclear 
energy, it is doing so at a relatively cautious pace because of strong domestic opposition.  
The opposition argues that Indonesia’s weak regulatory and administrative capabilities 
would fail to keep nuclear power safe, posing a great risk to the public.  This safety 
concern stems from both the possibilities of reactor accidents from human errors or 
natural disasters, and the possibilities of reactor sabotage from terrorist or separatist 
groups.  Indonesia is a known transit point for terrorists and its issues with violent 
 
204 Michael S. Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-White, “The Development of Latent Nuclear Capabilities in 
Southeast Asia: is the Outcome ‘All Too Predictable’?” The Nonproliferation Review 16, no. 3 (March 
2009), 15-17, 23-27, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/161toc.htm (accessed March 15, 2009) 
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206 Mark Hibbs, “More milestones set in 2009 for first two Vietnamese reactors,” Nucleonics Week 
49.44, October 30, 2008, 17, via Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed December 5, 2008). 
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separatists are not completely resolved.207  In light of these challenges, Indonesia is 
progressing towards nuclear energy at a measured pace, using this time to strengthen its 
capabilities concerning safety and security.  It is also using this time to win over the 
public by promoting the benefits of nuclear energy to its people. 
Thailand is in political turmoil and no opposition to nuclear energy development 
has emerged from this political mess.  The bureaucratic machine that is driving 
Thailand’s nuclear power development will trudge along its set path until it runs into a 
key decision point that requires national leadership level review.  Once it reaches this 
point, the progress towards nuclear energy development will grind to a halt, waiting for 
the political turmoil to end so this issue can be deliberated upon by the national 
leadership, who ever that may be once stability is restored.  It is too politically risky for 
any decision to be made on this issue while political power in Thailand is not yet 
consolidated.  Thailand also shares the safety and security concerns of Indonesia to some 
extent.  Thailand is a known transit point for terrorists and the separatists in the southern 
provinces are still willing to resort to extremes to promote their objectives.208  The 
combination of these issues influence the political will towards nuclear energy in 
Thailand to a level of “progressive ambivalence.”  It will progress on its path to nuclear 
power until it reaches a decision point.  Then it will be ambivalent until the politics in 
Bangkok settle down. 
C. KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
In developing the answers to the thesis question, four key finding with 
implications for the Unites States were discovered.  The first is that the motivation for 
nuclear energy in Southeast Asia is overwhelmingly for peaceful application.  Each 
government pursuing nuclear energy has a legitimate need and lacks the security 
environment that would necessitate nuclear weapons.  Furthermore, each Southeast Asian 
 
207 Symon, “Southeast Asia's Nuclear Power Thrust: Putting ASEAN's Effectiveness to the Test,” 
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country has demonstrated a commitment to the norm of non-proliferation through their 
membership in the NPT, the CTBT, and the SEANWFZ.  They are also a party to the 
IAEA Nuclear Safeguard and Verification regime and the IAEA Additional Protocols.  
This is even true with Burma, whose intention behind nuclear technology pursuit is less 
than clear.  This situation would indicate that nuclear energy development in Southeast 
Asia poses little threat to proliferation and thus less risk to U.S. interests in the region. 
The second finding is that most governments lack strong regulatory and 
administrative capacities.  Couple this with domestic security issues such as violent 
separatist groups and transnational terrorism and the task of ensuring adequate nuclear 
safety and security becomes a significant challenge.  Although countries pursuing nuclear 
energy recognize these weaknesses and are making an effort to improve, their efforts 
alone may not be enough to mitigate the risk posed by these threat to a level acceptable to 
the United States without U.S. involvement.  When the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative (GTRI) coordinated the removal and return of weapons grade uranium from Da 
Lat Vietnam to Russia, it also made a commitment of $80,000 for much needed security 
upgrades to the Da Lat research facility.  What GTRI coordinators saw at Da Lat was 
typical of security standards in Southeast Asian countries and it is significantly below 
Western standards.209  This poses a risk to U.S. interest in security and stability in 
Southeast Asia.  The U.S. policy towards nuclear energy development in Southeast Asia 
should be focused mainly on safety and security issues of this nature instead of 
proliferation.  This is not to say that proliferation should drop off the radar completely, 
only that it is not the immediate threat. 
The third finding is that nuclear power development in Southeast Asia is generally 
slow with the exception of Vietnam.  This also reduces the risk to U.S. interest because it 
allows for some assessment and reaction time on the part of U.S. decision makers.  
Vietnam, as the lone standout should be more carefully watched because of the rate at 
which it is pursuing nuclear energy.  The U.S. policy should promote maximum 
transparency with nuclear energy pursuers, especially Vietnam. 
 
209 Ralph Vartabedian, “A Race with the Terrorist,” Los Angeles Times, Edition A-1, September 27, 
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The fourth finding is that most governments in Southeast Asia are extremely 
concerned with demonstrating compliance with international norms and regulations.  This 
situation is conducive to U.S. engagement with countries pursuing nuclear energy to 
address safety and security issues, thus reduces the risk to U.S. interest in the region. 
D. RECOMMENDED U.S. POSITION ON NUCLEAR ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The United States stands to lose ground in the international order if it does not 
engage with countries in Southeast Asia on the issue of nuclear energy development.  As 
the dominant pole in a world that is becoming more multipolar, the United States would 
be doing what is expected by engaging these fledgling nuclear energy developers.  This 
engagement strategy must extend to every country interested in nuclear energy or nuclear 
technology, specifically Vietnam because of its rate of pursuit and Burma because of 
unclear motive behind its desire for nuclear technology.  The engagement must be 
narrowly focused on the nuclear energy issues and support the audience country’s efforts 
for peaceful application of nuclear energy and technology.  It must not include political 
detractors such as human rights or democratic values; instead it should promote safety, 
security, transparency and nonproliferation.  The singular purpose behind this 
engagement policy is the U.S. interest in regional stability.  This policy will facilitate 
more access and avenues of communications with each country in the long run.  It can 
become the U.S. “foot in the door” to increasingly reclusive Burma or another strand to 
strengthen the growing ties with Indonesia and Vietnam.  If executed properly, this policy 
can be a road for the vehicles of national power to take into the heart of countries that 
would otherwise resist it. 
1. The Benefits of an Engagement Policy 
It is easy to see the benefits of supporting nuclear energy in Southeast Asian 
countries that are in good standing with the United States.  But all countries serious about 
nuclear energy should be engaged.  At present, these countries include Burma, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and possibly the Philippines.  All of these countries are 
already receptive to international support from various sources including the United 
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States in most cases.  State to state engagement is only a natural evolution.  Other 
Southeast Asian countries may follow.  The benefits from engagement are strengthening 
ties of cooperation, providing an insider’s level of transparency against proliferation and 
safety oversight, and allowing greater U.S. influence over the direction of development in 
those countries. 
Extending engagement to countries not in good relations with the United States 
would extend these benefits to countries such as Burma.  Through engagement a level of 
transparency into the Burmese nuclear program can bet ascertained.  Burma was initially 
interested in assistance from the IAEA, signaling that it may be interested in assistance 
from other sources as well.  The key again is to not attach any preconditions that will 
drive Burma away.  Based upon Burma’s response to U.S. offers of assistance during 
cyclone Nargis, Burma is wary of U.S. engagement.  The reason for this may stems from 
the amount of U.S. criticism of its human rights record and its suppression of the 
democracy movement.  Again by not attaching engagement to these issues, U.S. 
engagement efforts stand a better chance of being accepted.  This would reduce the risk 
of Burma’s nuclear program and increase its level of transparency, an undeniable benefit 
to the United States. 
2. Shaping the Engagement Policy 
It is recognized that the engagement policy must be tailored to its audience 
country.  However, to maintain unity of purpose there must be commonalities.  The 
standard criteria conforming to international norms apply.  It is not necessary to reinvent 
the wheel.  These criteria were already well thought out for the U.S. Atoms for Peace 
Program.  The cooperation must be for peaceful applications only.  The level of 
transparency must be maximized to the greatest extent possible.  Standards of safety and 
security must be reached and maintained throughout the program’s life.  These are only 
examples of some common sense criteria.  The specifics would need further research and 
development.  It is recognized that the Atoms for Peace criteria would be a good starting 
point and should be modified for applicability in today’s environment.  But the U.S. 
engagement program must do more than demand these criteria, it must help facilitate it. 
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Specific characteristics tailored to each individual audience country should also 
be weighed and analyzed.  This can greatly affect the successful reception of U.S. 
engagement by catering to the societal actors and preferences within each country.  
Agriculture based economies with low levels of urbanization and/or relatively basic 
electric distribution networks may be more interested in the agricultural and medical 
application of nuclear technology.  On the other hand, highly urbanized industrial 
countries with high electricity demands and a sufficiently robust electrical distribution 
system may be interested in nuclear energy.  It is important to tailor the focus of the 
cooperation program towards what the audience country needs or thinks it needs.  U.S. 
hubris has often placed the United States in difficult positions because U.S. policy 
dictates to the host nation what it thinks is good for that country rather than listening to 
what the host nation desires.  This is not to say that U.S. policy should always conform to 
what the host nation desires, but rather that it should take those desires into account and 
address them seriously. 
Cooperation with Southeast Asian countries developing nuclear energy or 
researching nuclear technology provides an avenue of engagement.  Through this path the 
United States can better position itself to monitor transparency and proliferation issues, 
address safety and security concerns, and eventually provide some influence in the 
energy policy of the audience country.  The benefits to engagement outweigh the costs.  
For those that would accuse the United States of coddling dictators and ignoring the 
issues of human rights or democracy, it can be credibly argued that engagement on any 
level is better at opening the pathways for these issues to be addressed than isolation.  If 
change is to occur, then influence must reach the authority within these countries.  This 
nuclear energy renaissance can provide a second wave of increased U.S. influence into 
Southeast Asia through a policy of engagement and support. 
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